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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the "birth" of cognitive psychology in the 1950's, 
theories of memory have multiplied rapidly. While memory has 
been described in terms of multiple stores, multiple levels of 
processing, parallel distributed processing, analogical and 
propositional representation, most of these theories are 
similar in their reliance on mechanistic principles for their 
explanation of memory. This trend toward describing the human 
being in terms of the machine or computer model has continued 
as these theories have developed in their complexity and 
depth, and also as they have attempted to integrate memory 
with other aspects of human experience, most notably affect. 
However, opposing theories of memory and of affect have 
accounted for these constructs in thoroughly different ways, 
either in their definition of the construct "affect" itself, 
or in the predictions made for the impact of affect on memory. 
One major theoretical approach developed by Joseph F. 
Rychlak is Logical Learning Theory (LLT), which views affect 
as a cognitive process in itself that is part of a general 
capacity which human beings have to give meaning to their 
experience and environment. The introspective nature of this 
theory is apparent in its attempt to view both memory and 
affect from the individual's own point of view, as a 
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purposeful, goal-oriented process of construing or making 
sense of the world. The testable hypotheses produced by this 
theory are based on the process of predication, which subsumes 
both affect and memory, and also predicts and explains 
relationships between affect and remembered experience. 
In contrast, another body of memory theory regards affect 
as an experience that can be "encoded" in much the same way as 
other contents of memory are stored. This approach, which 
culminates in the theory and research of Gordon Bower (1981) 
and his colleagues, suggests testable hypotheses regarding the 
method in which memory processes can deal with emotional 
contents via associations between affective and semantic 
components. Bower's nodal network theory of affect (NNTA) is 
extraspective in its emphasis on the mechanisms of memory, 
which are driven by the frequency and contiguity of occurrence 
of the material to be remembered. 
The numerous empirical studies done on the role of mood 
in memory processes use a wide variety of methods, and produce 
diverse results. However, a large proportion of these studies 
rely on theories similar to NNTA in their explanation of 
---
results. One purpose of the present thesis is to demonstrate 
that such empirical results can also be accounted for by a 
predicational model of learning such as that of LLT. In 
addition, the study is intended to combat further the myth 
that an introspective theory such as LLT does not produce 
testable hypotheses. By clearly delineating both the 
3 
theoretical roots of the study as well as the predictions to 
be tested, this thesis will show that a rigorous experimental 
design can be utilized by predicational as well as mechanistic 
psychological models. 
The design of this thesis is intended to study in greater 
detail a situation in which Parrott and Sabini (1990) have 
demonstrated mood incongruent recall of memories, a finding 
whose challenge to the predictions of LLT was brought to J.F. 
Rychlak's attention by W.G. Parrott. The present thesis 
partially replicates and expands this earlier memory study in 
order to test its claims against the hypotheses generated by 
LLT. By further testing the effects of mood on learning 
itself, this thesis shows the effectiveness of LLT in 
predicting and explaining the differential effects of mood on 
both memory and learning. 
The 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Theoretical Factors 
framework in which the current study was 
conceptualized and carried out is Logical Learning Theory 
(LLT), developed by Joseph F. Rychlak (1988). My emphasis in 
this theoretical overview will be on the core assumptions and 
constructs that define LLT as teleological, critically 
idealistic, and introspective. These fundamentals 
differentiate LLT from the mainly mechanistic, "realistic," 
and extraspective mainstream theories of learning, including 
those most often referred to in studies of mood and memory. 
Logical Learning Theory 
Basic Assumptions 
The historical context out of which LLT has developed can 
best be understood by beginning with Aristotle's four types of 
causality. "Scientific" conceptualizations in the hard 
sciences such as chemistry or physics are most often thought 
of as relying on Aristotle's first and second principles of 
causal explanation: material cause, or the physical stuff out 
of which a thing is made, and efficient cause, or the driving 
force which moves the physical thing from one state to 
4 
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another. In contrast, LLT emphasizes the central role in 
human experience and behavior of Aristotle's third and fourth 
types of causality: formal cause, or the essential patterns 
that compose an object or activity, and final cause, or that 
reason, goal, objective, etc., for the sake of which any 
action or process is performed. According to LLT, humans 
cannot be understood merely in terms of their physical "being" 
and related drives originating in past experience; it is 
crucial to take into account the patterns and goals that a 
person actively frames as ends or purposes for action. For 
this reason, LLT is a teleological conceptualization of 
individuals: purposive, goal-directed behavior is seen as the 
most distinctive aspect and ability of human beings. 
Logical Learning Theory makes the claim that people are 
able to choose goals and ends in an active sense, rather than 
being passively receptive to externally determined 
motivations. One tenet essential to this telic sense of the 
human being is an idealistic view of the world, according to 
which the person must formulate her own conceptualization or 
"ideal" of what is both real and meaningful, rather than 
understanding "reality" to be directly in the world itself. 
Here LLT draws heavily on the concepts of Immanuel Kant, whose 
philosophy makes a distinction between the noumena, the actual 
world existing as itself and unformulated by human knowledge, 
and phenomena, the world as understood by humans. According 
to this model, the world is presumed to be in existence 
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independently of our interaction with it, yet the "true" 
nature of things is not directly accessible to humans. 
Instead, a person must utilize her own ability to frame and 
organize the "raw data" of sensation into a knowable world. 
Kant speaks of categories of understanding, or inherent 
"frameworks" for making sense out of "the blooming buzzing 
confusion" of the world. Rather than assuming that sensory 
input is directly imprinted on an essentially blank, passive 
sponge-like mind, LLT continues in the Kantian vein as it 
views the human person as an active participator in the 
creation of her own reality. Logical Learning Theory points 
out that in the widely-used psychological construct of 
"response," a person's activities are assumed to be directed 
by the events of the world that happen to the individual. In 
contrast, LLT uses the construct "telosponse," by which is 
meant that the person interprets and places meaning upon the 
world in order to act purposefully. This emphasis on the 
active construction of reality designates LLT as Kantian and 
idealistic in its world view. 
Another way of understanding the Kantian model is through 
its definition of and emphasis on meaning. The noumena or 
external world is only knowable through the organizing 
principles that Kant calls the categories of understanding; 
the meaning of any object to be known or understood is 
dependent upon these categories. One can think of such a 
category as similar to a pair of eyeglasses through which all 
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experience is seen. These broad, basic assumptions serve as 
a starting point for coming to know anything. Kant's 
categories are some of the most basic of such frameworks: 
examples are possibility and impossibility, existence and non-
existence, necessity and contingency. Without using such 
basic organizing principles, a person would be unable to learn 
anything about the world. This is the essence of the Kantian 
model: One must be able to make basic assumptions which apply 
to and formulate the meaning of any object or event one wants 
to learn about. 
The personal, individualized nature of this active 
meaning-making becomes clear when one realizes that each 
person comes to understand and formulate her own experience of 
the world in her own unique way. In keeping with its claim to 
be a theory about people as individual framers of existence, 
LLT acknowledges this personal nature of meaning, and it does 
so by taking an introspective view of the human being. This 
"view from within" means that a psychologist tries to see the 
contents and events of the world from the perspective of the 
person she is trying to understand, from a first-person point 
of view. The observation and understanding of events or 
behaviors then takes place with the subject, as if "standing 
in her shoes." LLT maintains that in psychology, the 
viewpoint of the individual is crucial because she is an agent 
in creating the reality in which she behaves. 
As LLT is examined from the perspective of the 
8 
descriptive role of theory, its underlying assumptions become 
clear. According to its Kantian, idealistic world view, LLT 
sees humans as participating actively in their own 
environmental interpretations. The description of this active 
nature of human behavior is reflected in LLT's avowed 
teleological emphasis. In addition, the introspective 
emphasis of LLT uses the "first-person" viewpoint of the 
individual herself to describe human activity. 
While Kant's philosophy provides several background 
assumptions for LLT, a central question which LLT addresses is 
how the philosophical concept of "categories of the 
understanding" can be conceptualized in terms of the 
psychological processes of humans. The telosponse has thus 
far been described as a purposeful process of placing meaning 
onto the environment; however, an in-depth understanding of 
LLT's explanation of how this happens requires the context of 
another fundamental concept, that of dialectic logic. 
Dialectic versus Demonstrative Logic 
In considering the "logical" side of Logical Learning 
Theory, it is important to distinguish between two forms of 
logic: dialectic and demonstrative. In demonstrative logic, 
the parallel between what is known and what is in the world is 
seen to be a one-to-one correspondence. The facts of the 
world are "out there," there is one truth to the way things 
are, and logic is a way of proceeding towards grasping this 
truth. Scientists using demonstrative logic see themselves as 
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mapping the universe step by step as they fit data together 
like puzzle pieces into a whole. Demonstrative logic might be 
thought of as the rules for fitting the puzzle pieces/elements 
of experience together. As Rychlak (1988) points out, 
demonstrative logic is usually linked to material and 
efficient causes and to an objective, extraspective world 
view. According to this logic, fixed objects in the material 
world change because of efficient cause forces pushing in 
various directions. By using demonstrative logic as a single 
set of rules, these linear changes can be predicted. The 
analogy of the world or the person as a giant watch is based 
on demonstrative logic. There are material-cause "gears," and 
there is efficiently-caused movement of the gears against each 
other. The interactions may be very complex, but if the 
logician qua scientist observes and experiments carefully 
enough, she will be able to find out exactly how that watch 
works. 
Dialectic logic throws a wrench in the gears. This form 
of logic is Kantian in that the idea of a single, directly 
knowable world is rejected in favor of a constructed, 
interpretive, idealistic world view. Dialectic is based on 
the idea that for every way of looking at things, in every 
basic assumption, in every object or concept, there is another 
inherently opposite aspect. There is no one concept that "is" 
without there being another concept related to it that is its 
opposite, at the very least in the sense of its negation. 
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There are several ways of defining dialectic. It can be seen 
to be operating in the universe itself, as Hegel postulated 
and Marx applied in the formulation of a thesis reacting 
against an antithesis to lead to a synthesis. Dialectic can 
also be seen in the conceptualization of the human being who 
tries to make sense of the world. For every "sense" made, 
there is an opposite case which can be brought to mind. 
Dialectic can be seen as an interaction between people, as in 
Socrates' dialectic method of teaching: the student takes one 
side of an issue and the teacher takes the opposite. By 
discussing the implications of each side, a conclusion can be 
reached, not by coming up with the one right answer, but by 
following the interplay between the two sides and deciding on 
which side one would personally will stand. 
One of the earliest sources for dialectic logic is 
Heraclitus' concept of change in all things, which is given 
stability not by fixed bodies of matter, but by the pattern or 
"logos" which can be seen in the universe. According to this 
view, the world is not merely material elements being fixed 
and steady until a force comes along to move or change them. 
The change and process of reality is always present, and logos 
is the pattern which lends stability and understanding to this 
constant process. Dialectic is a form of logos/logic that 
sees the interplay of opposites in all things, and sees 
learning and knowledge to be an understanding of this 
patterned process. In LLT, this oppositionality can be seen 
11 
in four distinctive ways--via contrariety ("all X's are A" 
versus "no X's are A"), contradiction ("all X's are A" versus 
"at least one Xis not A"), negation ("all X's are A" versus 
"A is not relevant to X") , and contrast ("A is more similar to 
X, non-A is less similar to X"). Each of these oppositional 
frameworks offer bipolar conceptualizations of any target. 
Now the importance of Kantian-like categories is again 
emphasized. In dialectic logic, there is no fixed single 
world of data which will imprint on a person's mind; rather, 
the pattern or logos is essential to understanding. Such a 
pattern is the regular, formal cause weaving of meaningful 
relationships between elements. While some dialectic 
theorists such as Hegel hold that these relationships are "out 
there," in the world itself, Rychlak's {1988) formulation of 
LLT employs both the Kantian, formal cause categories and an 
introspective view of the person along with the dialectic of 
logos. The picture of the person that emerges is someone who 
must conceptualize patterns in her own process of learning 
about the world. The pattern of relationships between items 
must be formulated by the person, internally and 
dialectically. The person can see two sides of things, reason 
oppositionally, and come to a conclusion based on her 
conceptualization of how these opposites form patterns. 
Predication and Meaning 
If a person can always see two sides to everything, how 
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exactly does meaning arise, much less patterns of meaning? To 
answer this, LLT begins by defining "to mean" as the act of 
relating two or more constructs, ideas, or propositions in 
one's understanding, and "meaning" as the organized 
relationship thus created between these terms. The act of 
meaning is possible because human beings are able to not only 
formulate two sides of any concept, but also to take a stand 
on or affirm one side or the other. This affirmation would be 
equivalent to saying to oneself, "I can see A and I can see 
non-A. The situation could be seen either way. Which way do 
.I see it? I choose A." Neither side of the issue is forced 
onto the person by a necessary rule, because in a dialectic 
logic, both aspects are possible for the person to consider 
and affirm. The person has the capacity to choose one or the 
other. 
It is central to note that the affirmation to which LLT 
refers does not take place in a vacuum. The person does not 
consider which side of a purely abstract issue on which to 
take a stand. Nor is the framework an element or thing in 
itself; it is a pattern, a way of seeing the world which is 
brought to bear on or related to a target. The affirmation is 
made for the sake of some sensation, idea, or any target which 
is to be made sense of, understood, or learned. Thus, LLT 
speaks of a larger or broader formulation of meaning which 
frames a target and thereby gives it meaning. This process of 
bringing an affirmed framework to bear on a target is called 
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predication. We say that the broader pattern predicates the 
target when the person affirms that a certain category 
encompasses the target. This is analogous to drawing a circle, 
the broad meaning, around a target. The target thus receives 
its meaning from the category which is placed around it. 
The concept of a predicate here is similar to the 
grammatical use of the word, in which the verb clause of a 
sentence is the predicate or pattern of meaning which shapes 
one's understanding of the subject of the sentence. In 
"Arthur is handsome," the predicate phrase "is handsome" is 
affirmed (as opposed to "is not handsome" or "is ugly") for 
the sake of understanding the target noun "Arthur;" the 
broader framework is brought to bear on the subject, and in 
this pattern, in this case the sentence, "Arthur" takes on the 
meaning "is handsome." Thus, in predication, one affirms one 
side or the other of a basic, dialectic category or pattern 
for the sake of a target. By taking a stand for oneself as to 
where the thing/target falls in one's patterns of 
understanding, a person predicates that target with the 
pattern of meaning of the broader category. 
Meaning-extension 
Another way to look at the formation of these meaningful 
relationships between predicates and targets is via the 
concept of tautology. A pure tautology is a relationship of 
meaning between two items in which they are seen as being 
absolutely identical in meaning. This would be seen in 
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associationistic theories to be a result of the two being 
linked in experience often and close together in time. In 
LLT, one of the i terns is seen to be the broad frame of 
reference or precedent meaning which is targeted towards the 
other and defines its meaning. An example is "A bachelor is 
an unmarried male." The concept "unmarried male" is the 
broader meaning which is extended to the word "bachelor." In 
this use of tautology, both terms have equal meanings. 
However, items or concepts can also be partially tautologized 
when the precedent is of a broader, more basic meaning and 
something is placed within its purview. This is what happens 
in predication. The precedent is what is assumed, affirmed, 
or already known, as in the major premise in a formal 
syllogism (e.g., All humans are mortal). If a target is 
proposed in the minor premise (e.g., This is a human), a 
tautological, necessary relationship of meaning extends from 
the precedent to the target (e.g. , This human is mortal) . The 
formation of this relationship does not take place across time 
in a linear fashion, as if a force efficiently causes meaning 
to be attached to the target (e.g., the concept "All humans 
are mortal" pushing or driving this human to be mortal). 
Instead, there is an immediate, formal cause ordering of the 
target concept in terms of the major, predicating concept. 
Because of the pattern in which it is placed, the target 
necessarily, (tauto-)logically, or sequaciously takes on the 
meaning of the precedent assumptions brought to bear on it. 
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Thus, meaning is seen in LLT as neither haphazard nor 
embedded in "reality. " Instead, meaning is created and 
extended through the patterns established in a person's 
fundamental, precedent assumptions or assessments of the 
world. The "logical" in logical learning theory originates 
from the idea that the meaningful relationships between 
concepts are not merely associated through frequency and 
contiguity of experience, but evolve as a logical consequence 
of a person's predication of experience. For example, if a 
person takes the stand that science is the study of purely 
material and efficient causes, and brings that assumption to 
bear on the target of psychology, then scientific psychology 
will necessarily be seen as, and will "mean," a material and 
efficient cause area of study. The precedent assumptions are 
seen as predicating the nature of the target for the sake of 
which understanding is sought. 
Predication as a Process 
The question naturally arises, if each meaningful 
relationship stems from preceding, framing assumptions, where 
do the assumptions "come from?" Logical Learning Theory 
maintains that a human being is inherently capable of framing 
these assumptions herself, from (at least) birth on. 
Predication is not a matter of the contents of the mind, but 
a process of viewing the world oppositionally, and taking a 
stand on how a targeted item is to be framed by the spectrum 
of one's precedent meanings. It is a process in which one 
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affirms, or oppositionally disaffirms or denies a premise. In 
the act of affirmation, the meaning of the premise is 
tautologically, sequaciously extended from this broad, 
"already known" meaning, be it basic or complex, to the 
targeted item to be understood or learned. 
When the process of extending meaning is "pushed back" to 
its beginnings, the questions arises: Where does this start? 
How do we arrive at the most fundamental assumptions or 
predications? Are we humans not always caught within the 
confines of what has been put by the world into our brains in 
the first place? To view cognition this way is to focus on 
the contents of the mind, as material things that can be moved 
around or stretched or shifted by efficient-cause forces 
across time. It is important to remember that predication is 
seen in LLT to be a telosponsive process of applying formal-
cause patterns in a final-cause fashion for the sake of the 
items to be understood. While there may be a first time the 
process of predication takes place, perhaps around birth, this 
is not efficiently or materially caused; the process happens 
as a basic function of mind organizing targeted items. Just 
as the stomach acts in the process of digestion, the mind acts 
in predication. And as food does not "cause" digestion, 
objects or targets do not "cause" predication. The cause is 
inherent in the patterns and purposive nature of cognition 
itself. 
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Affect 
Logical Learning Theory posits that one of the most basic 
and abstract telosponses human beings make is that termed 
"affection." In this predication, a person takes a stand on 
a given sensation or concept as to whether it is a "good" 
thing or a "bad" thing, whether it is positive or negative, 
liked or disliked. "Affective assessment" is the name LLT 
gives to this primary predication, in which a person 
reflexively views and judges any experience. Affect as an 
assessment of the meaning of an event is thus differentiated 
from a purely physiological event such as pain or pleasure; it 
is a cognitive process which evaluates what an event means to 
the individual. 
Here a fundamental challenge is made to the definition 
proposed by the James-Lange theory of emotion, according to 
which emotion is itself the result of physiological arousal. 
In the definition of LLT, emotion is seen as arising from 
sensations in the body, but the experience of affect is 
distinguished as the result of transcending or "turning back" 
upon any experience, physiological or otherwise, and 
evaluating, interpreting, and judging those feelings. While 
the experienced affect of a person may have many intricate 
connotations forming the pattern of meaning for a target, a 
basic dimension of positive/good versus negative/bad is seen 
by LLT to be an underlying, predicating framework used to 
evaluate experience. Logical Learning Theory's definition of 
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affect is discussed below in terms of its implications for 
research. 
Other Teleological Theories 
Rychlak's (1988) LLT is not alone in its espousal of a 
teleological, idealistic, introspective view of human beings. 
All three themes are evident in Alfred Adler's (1914/1956) 
individual psychology, which holds that a person acts to 
fulfill her "final fiction," or individual construction of how 
the world and the self should be. Adler's concept of the 
"style of life" is the organized pursuit of this goal, which 
shapes all of the person's behaviors, thoughts and decisions. 
Adler emphasizes teleology, individual perspective, and a 
Kantian world-view in his theory, as evident in the following 
quote: 
"Individual Psychology insists absolutely on the 
indispensability of finalism for the understanding of all 
psychological phenomena. Causes, powers, instincts, 
impulses, and the like cannot serve as explanatory 
principles. The final goal alone can. Experiences, 
traumata, sexual development mechanisms cannot yield an 
explanation, but the perspective in which these are 
regarded, the individual way of seeing them, which 
subordinates all life to the final goal, can do so" (p. 
92, Adler, 1914/1956). 
Gordon Allport is also explicit in maintaining, along 
with the philosopher Leibnitz, that "the person is not a 
19 
collection of acts, nor simply the locus of acts; the person 
is the source of acts" (p. 12, Allport, 1955). In 
formulating his psychology of becoming, Allport insists that 
the unique 
"proprium" 
maintenance 
and purposive striving of a person's self or 
is irreducible to efficient causes such as the 
of equilibrium. He also distinguishes the 
proprium from a material "thing," saying that "proprium is a 
term intended to cover those functions that make for the 
peculiar unity and distinctiveness of personality" (p. 61, 
Allport, 1955). 
The personal construct theory of George Kelly (1963) also 
sees humans as constructive, purposive, and unique. While 
Kelly presumes, as did Kant, that the universe "really" 
exists, he emphasizes that this universe only influences a 
person to the degree that she construes or interprets the 
"facts" as significant in her own world. Kelly's fundamental 
postulate, "A person's processes are psychologically 
channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events," is 
elucidated in several of his corollaries which underline the 
construction, individuality, organization, and choice-making 
capability of the human being (p. 46, Kelly, 1963). 
The present study of the effect of mood on memory was 
explicitly guided by the precedent assumptions and specific 
definitions of LLT. However, as pointed out earlier, most 
research in psychology, including that on memory and affect, 
has been based either explicitly or implicitly on different 
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conceptualizations of what a scientific psychology should be. 
we turn now to some of these other conceptualizations before 
describing some widely used explanations of the interaction 
between emotion and memory. 
Lockean Theoretical Approaches 
Basic Assumptions 
As mentioned above, the fields of physics, chemistry, and 
biology began their development being called natural or "hard" 
sciences because of their tradition of empirical exploration 
of the material and efficient causes of natural events. In 
the twentieth century, radical shifts have occurred in the 
paradigms used in each of these hard sciences, leading many 
"physical science" researchers to abandon the strictures 
against using formal or even final causation in their theories 
and hypotheses. However, American psychology's attempts to 
emulate the hard-nosed, empirical aspects of natural science 
began long before concepts of relativity or of the 
participation of the scientist in her own observations gained 
prominence in the natural sciences. Researchers trying to 
make psychology a science have most often theorized about 
human beings using only material and efficient causes as valid 
forms of explanation. 
The philosophy of John Locke is helpful in understanding 
the implications of the material/efficient cause approach. 
Locke based his views on the assumption that there are simple, 
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primary elements out of which all more complex objects in the 
world or concepts in the mind are composed. The key to 
understanding a complex being or idea is to break it up into 
its more elemental, simpler constituents. Locke further 
proposed that the only way people have any contents in 
consciousness is through the input of these simple "building 
blocks" into our minds through sensation. Locke ' s famous 
"tabula rasa" analogy represents this process by which basic 
primary data are imprinted onto the blank slate of a human 
mind. It is only by the post hoc combination of these 
"blocks" into more complex structures that humans arrive at 
abstract or general ideas. 
In the Lockean model, the material cause, or "stuff" of 
human thinking and experience is the original set of elemental 
building blocks, which are impressed into the passive mind by 
the efficient cause or "push" of sensations. All other more 
complex cognitive experiences, from judgments to choices, are 
explained by reduction to these simpler material and efficient 
causes. Because these causes are identical with those that 
are usually used to explain the existence and operation of 
machines, the Lockean approach can be termed mechanistic. 
Formal cause patterns and final cause purposes would be seen 
as epiphenomena that can be explained away in favor of 
material and efficient causes. 
Now the contrasts to LLT's assumptions become obvious, 
beginning with the very causes upon which a theory rests. 
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First, in a Lockean model, the formal cause patterns and final 
cause purposes seen as essential to teleology are reduced to 
associations between elements which have originated in the 
natural world. Goal-directed, systematic behavior is seen 
from this standpoint as originating not from within the 
person, but from without, from the influences of the world 
which impact on the person without need for any purpose within 
the organism. 
Second, the highly realistic world view of the Lockean 
model is apparent, in that it assumes that details of the 
world itself constitute the elements of sensation that are 
plotted onto the human understanding. Interpretation is not 
necessary to understand our environment; our observations are 
direct and unimpeded, except perhaps by the filtering effect 
of previous imprints. Whatever patterns of understanding we 
have resemble literal maps representing pieces of our 
environment rather than interpretations or construction of 
events. Putting the pieces of the map together takes place 
according to the rules of demonstrative, linear logic which is 
seen as deriving itself from external laws of reality. 
Finally, the extraspective nature of a Lockean approach 
is clear in that the object of study is seen "from without," 
in third-person ("it") terms, as opposed to the introspective 
"from within" approach, which employs a first-person ("I") 
description. A person is seen as being "over there," as 
something to figure out much as one would scientifically 
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examine a machine or a plant. The subject's own 
conceptualizations about the topic at hand are, to the 
extraspective scientist's understanding, irrelevant at best 
and misleading at worst. The experience of a person of 
"making a choice" or "resisting temptation" may seem to her to 
be purposive or free, but this opinion would not figure into 
the account of someone working from an extraspective approach. 
To that scientist, what is observed are the external 
influences impacting on the object of study and pushing her to 
behave in one way or another. 
Many prominent theorists operate out of the Lockean 
tradition, incorporating material-efficient cause, realistic 
world views, and extraspective approaches in their work. 
Perhaps the most obvious would be the work of B.F. Skinner 
(1974), whose "black box" psychology relied exclusively on 
observations of external reinforcers of human behavior. 
However, it is not only the explicitly behavioristic stimulus-
response or "S-R" theories that rely on the Lockean model; 
modern cognitive models also consider the "organism" in the 
"S-0-R" to be receiving elements of sensation directly and 
passively from the world and rearranging these given building 
blocks according to pathways shaped by past experience, which 
then drives them to further activity. 
Lockean Views of Affect 
The research on interface between affect and cognition is 
often highly Lockean in theory. An example can be seen in 
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Isen's (1984) review of theoretical implications of mood and 
memory research. Isen declines to use a "grand theory 
integrating our efforts and discoveries" (p. 184) , yet her 
implicit reliance on a realist world view and non-telic 
causation are apparent. She states that her definition of 
affect is not entirely complete or conclusive; however, she 
cites investigations of the neurochemical pathways of the 
brain (material/efficient cause emphasis) and basic perceptual 
reactions to specific features of a stimulus (direct, real-
world input) to outline the parameters within which affect is 
to be discussed. Isen (1984) specifically rejects an 
examination of the consequences of the experience of emotion. 
Instead, she focuses on the impact of affect (defined as 
essentially equivalent to emotion) on cognitive processes, 
eliminating phenomenal experience and interpretation from the 
loop of causation used to explain affect itself. It might be 
argued that Isen's consideration of the influence of affect on 
the "meaning" of stimuli is an attempt to admit telic aspects 
of human behavior to the field of inquiry. However, her 
discussion makes it clear that she considers affect to be a 
context which is derived from the environment and/or 
physiology, which later has an impact on what stimuli are 
thought to mean. This seems to be more of an efficient cause 
push of an emotional "force" on the object/stimulus to be 
understood, rather than an organization and shape given to 
affect itself by an internally defined, purposive meaning. 
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Most relevant to the topic of this thesis, mood and 
memory, is the work of cognitive psychologist Gordon Bower, 
whose theory of emotion and memory has figured prominently in 
a majority of research in this field. Many studies 
explicitly adopt his theory in designing their approach or 
interpreting their results, while others have primarily 
utilized the labels for phenomena generated by Bower's (1981) 
nodal network theory of affect. In either case, it is this 
theory which represents the major theoretical alternative to 
LLT for the understanding of the relationship between mood and 
memory. For this reason, and to better understand the actual 
empirical work in the field, we will outline here the history, 
specific constructs, and predictions of Bower's nodal network 
theory of affect (NNTA). 
Development of Network Theory 
As controversy arose in cognitive psychology over the 
primacy of affect versus the primacy of cognition (e.g. , 
Lazarus, 1984; Zajonc, 1984), cognitive psychologists were 
already including the effects of emotions in their hypotheses 
and in their explanations of cognitive phenomena. For 
example, Isen, Shalker, Clark and Karp (1979) discussed the 
effects of being in a good mood on judgments of events and on 
the learning of words. They proposed that a cognitive loop 
between positive thoughts, memories, and associations may 
facilitate maintenance of a positive mood. This loop was 
thought to make similarly valenced concepts more accessible 
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for retrieval, explaining why people in a good mood would be 
more positive in their recollections of neutral events, and 
learn positive items more easily. However, the construct of 
a cognitive loop was not clearly defined in terms of its 
application to theories of memory. 
The predecessor of Bower's ( 1980) nodal network theory of 
affect was the network theory of memory as explicated by 
Collins and Loftus (1975), which seemed particularly suited to 
the task of explaining the cognitive loop. According to this 
model, mental concepts are made up of large amounts of 
information elements, and each unit of information is 
represented in a "node." The nodes are linked into a network, 
with characteristics of the concept being represented by links 
between nodes, each of which is labeled to designate the type 
and direction of the relationship between the nodes. The 
appearance of a concept in consciousness is a result of the 
"activation" of its corresponding node above a certain 
threshold. The activation of one node results in some degree 
of activation for any nodes linked to it, thus priming those 
concepts for possible activation above the threshold. This 
spreading-activation theory further proposes that the amount 
of activation that spreads between nodes depends on the links 
between them, which vary in their accessibility. The strength 
or travel time of a 1 ink depends on the frequency and 
contiguity with which the concepts represented by the nodes 
are associated. For example, if the concept of "patient" was 
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nearly always used at the same time as "doctor," the link 
going from the "doctor" node to the "patient" node (which 
might be labeled "treats") would be strong, and much of the 
activation of the "doctor" node would spread quickly to the 
"patient" node. Yet if "doctor" were also used in connection 
with "BMW," but only occasionally, the link ("drives") would 
be weak, and the second node may only be slightly primed by 
activation of the first. 
Here it is clear that both the nodes and the links 
employed in network theories are analogized with material 
cause elements whose "strength" is efficiently caused by the 
frequent occurrence of stimuli across time. An association is 
made automatically when two elements are often and closely (in 
time) presented, much as in the Lockean concept of elements 
being inscribed on a blank slate. While LLT would see the 
relationship in "A doctor treats a patient" as a purposive 
predication of meaning; the formation, linking, and activation 
of nodes is seen in the network theory as similar to an 
electrical (material cause) wiring system, powered by input of 
stimuli or energy (efficient cause) from the external world. 
Nodal Network Theory of Affect 
In a nodal network, any meaningful idea or proposition 
can be represented by a node, and any relationship between 
concepts can be represented by a link. Thus, it was a rather 
smooth transition for Bower (1981) to adapt this model to the 
representation of emotion in memory. According to this 
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approach, each distinct emotion also has a node in the 
network, which is connected via associative links to other 
nodes for all the aspects of that emotion, such as verbal 
labels, autonomic reactions, expressive behaviors, and 
descriptions of situations which have evoked or could evoke 
that emotion. For example, the emotion of anger might be 
linked to the word "anger," the physical feeling of having a 
flushed face and a tense neck, the action of shaking one's 
fist and yelling, and the situation of being cut off on the 
expressway. 
The links between each of these nodes for propositions, 
events, and emotions vary in strength, depending on the degree 
of association between the concepts. If a person experiences 
an emotion (e.g., sadness) in conjunction with a particular 
event (e.g., failing a test), concept (e.g., death), or word 
(e.g., "blue") or , a link between the emotion node and the 
node for this item will form, or if it already exists, the 
link will be strengthened. 
An important emphasis of Bower's (1981) formulation of a 
nodal network theory of affect is that, much like Collins and 
Loftus' (1975) spreading activation theory, the activation of 
one node can spread to all nodes connected to it, whether that 
node represents an emotion or a particular event from one's 
life. Thus, if the nodes which represent the propositions 
describing one's high school prom are activated, an associated 
node for happiness may be activated. If the activation level 
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exceeds the "happy" node's threshold, the emotion of happiness 
would be experienced. 
An emotion node can also be stimulated directly by 
external events - for example, if a person receives a gift -
and the resulting activation would spread through the network 
to connected nodes. Associated nodes representing words such 
as "pleasant," actions such as smiling, or similar events such 
as going to a party, would receive some of the spreading 
activation, and may either be primed to a subthreshold level 
of excitation, or cross the threshold and emerge into 
consciousness. Additional excitation of a primed emotion node 
can additively lead to "firing" and consequent conscious 
experience. Furthermore, the firing of a specific emotion 
node itself should, according to this theory, spread its 
excitation along these links to prime other nodes, such as 
emotional events or words, and facilitate their activation. 
The Lockean tradition is quite evident in Collins and 
Loftus' (1975) network theory, and its extension in Bower's 
(1981) NNTA. The basic elements of a complex idea or emotion, 
as represented in nodes, are reminiscent of the material cause 
building blocks emphasized by Locke. The drive of spreading 
activation between nodes is an efficient cause explanation for 
the way a person stores, arranges, and retrieves these mental 
materials. In contrast to LLT, meaning is essentially 
irrelevant to NNTA. If meaning were to be addressed, it would 
likely be defined as the activation of nodes as triggered by 
current external stimuli, in 
contiguity of past associations. 
viewpoint thus: 
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addition to frequency and 
Bower (1981) outlines his 
"A relevant analogy is an electrical network in which 
terminals correspond to concepts or event nodes (units), 
connective wires correspond to associative relations with 
more or less resistance, and electrical energy 
corresponds to activation that is injected into one or 
more nodes (units) in the network" (p. 134). 
In this system, a human being's experience of meaning would 
certainly not be a central cause itself in predicating 
behavior; it would be seen as a by-product of the firing of 
these nodes in response to external stimuli, with little room 
for teleology at all. 
Before turning to the empirical research done in both the 
Kantian tradition of LLT and the more Lockean traditions such 
as the work of Bower, a final distinction must be made between 
the two. While both traditions are empirically rigorous in 
their research, the differing viewpoints on how knowledge is 
gained lead each side to approach research differently. When 
knowledge is seen as dependent on the assumptions or 
predications of the observer/participant, empirical research 
becomes a way of validating the claims made by a theory with 
observation. This is the "top down" approach taken by LLT: 
explicit predictions made by the theory are tested in order to 
see if the constructs we use to explain the world fit with the 
observed world. 
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When knowledge is seen as being derived 
directly from the observations themselves, as in the view of 
a realist, theory is less prominent in guiding the actual 
research, instead being put together piece by piece from the 
observed "facts." The "bottom up" approach of the dustbowl 
empiricist attempts to rule out bias in the observation of 
events by keeping theories small and directly tied to 
observation. This seems to be more the case with NNTA, which 
is ref erred to in many studies of mood and memory not as a 
guiding formulation of the research, but as an explanation of 
the observed phenomena. 
Yet, as pointed out, both approaches rely on empirical 
observation in order to test and communicate their scientific 
formulations. Often these two 
particular topic of investigation. 
paths converge upon a 
Thus, both LLT and NNTA 
research arrived at the topic of mood and memory interactions 
via, quite different routes. The next step of this review is 
to document the research leading up to the present study, from 
both the LLT and NNTA perspectives. Since the current thesis 
is informed primarily by LLT's approach, we will begin with 
the research supporting its claims. 
Empirical Factors 
Research on Logical Learning Theory 
The central tenet of LLT is that human beings predicate 
or personally construe meaning for every aspect of interaction 
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with the world. This use of predicate assumptions also occurs 
in scientific settings, in both the activity of the 
experimenter and the subject of the experiment, whether this 
is explicitly acknowledged by the researchers or not. The 
emphasis of research on LLT has been to put the contributions 
of the subject's predications directly into the design of 
studies, so that this process can itself be examined. One of 
the goals of empirical investigation of telic aspects of human 
learning and experience is to measure predication as an 
explicit, evaluative, and intentional variable, and "to assert 
that it is at play in every experimental study done on human 
beings" (Rychlak, 1988, p.323). 
To do this, LLT researchers turned to affective factors 
involved in learning, which have been under investigation ever 
since Tait (1913) followed Wundt's tripartite theory of 
emotion to find that pleasant words were easier to learn than 
unpleasant words. Many other studies confirmed this finding 
in various formats of rating involving pleasantness and 
learning tasks. Logical Learning Theory's prediction of 
easier learning of liked words is based on the hypothesis that 
a positively assessed item is more consistent in a formal 
cause manner with most people's current first premises - that 
is, a generally positive outlook on life - and thus meaning 
can be more congruently extended to it, facilitating learning. 
Researchers investigating LLT's predictions demonstrated this 
positive effect under conditions where people did approach the 
experiment 
phenomenon 
with positive 
was labeled by 
precedent assumptions; 
Matlin and Stang (1978) 
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this 
the 
"Pollyanna principle." "Liked" items were learned more 
quickly than "disliked," whether learning occurred with lists 
of all positive, all negative, or both kinds of items, whether 
the learning format used a series of items or paired 
associates, whether rate of learning was measured by trials-
to-criterion, recognition, or free recall (Abramson, 1967; 
Laberteaux, 1968; Rychlak, 1966). Rychlak and his colleagues 
explained this methodological phenomenon by proposing that the 
judgment of an item as "liked" or "disliked" is a basic 
evaluative predication, in which a person takes a stand on how 
she feels about the object. The conceptual ordering of 
experience that takes place in this "affective assessment" 
guides further learning, or meaning extension, along a 
consistent, patterned, formal cause route. 
Research on LLT has aimed at establishing that this 
affective assessment is a truly individual and telic process. 
This process has been shown to influence learning 
independently of Lockean constructs such as the history of 
reinforcement of a word, frequency of contact with the items, 
or associations that could be generated from the item. To 
establish this independence, it was first necessary to devise 
a method by which the prior familiarity or reinforcement 
history of items could be measured. Therefore, consonant-
vowel-consonant (CVC) trigrams were utilized in learning, for 
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which normative data has been developing to measure the 
"wordlikeness" of the item. Archer's (1960) norms were 
developed by presenting all possible consonant-vowel-consonant 
combinations (e.g. HIB, MOY, ZUC) to subjects and having them 
rate each according to whether it looked like a word, sounded 
like a word, or could be used in a sentence. This nomothetic 
measure is often referred to as "association value" (AV), and 
the Archer norms can be used as a criterion for familiarity of 
a eve trigram. 
A Lockean theorist would predict faster learning of i terns 
which are already familiar to a person, because the higher 
frequency with which the item had been presented would, in 
network theory terms, prime the node associated with the item 
and facilitate its later firing. Links between an item and 
other nodes are also strengthened by frequency of 
presentation, which may further enhance familiarity. The 
actual liking of an item may itself be explained as a link 
between the item and the "liking" or "disliking" node, or as 
a number of links to other positive emotions. If frequent 
presentation (experienced as familiarity) strengthens these 
links, it would be concluded that AV, the degree to which an 
item resembles something familiar like a word, underlies the 
phenomena of learning liked trigrams. 
A major accomplishment of LLT research was to show that 
affective assessment (AA) has an effect on learning apart from 
the effect of AV. Abramson, Tasto, and Rychlak (1969) found 
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that no matter how familiar or unfamiliar trigrams were to 
subjects (as measured by the nomothetic norms), items 
affectively assessed as positive were more easily learned by 
normal subjects than those assessed as negative. AA effects 
functioned statistically independently of nomothetic AV 
effects. This same independence of effects was found when 
familiarity of the items was idiographically assessed for 
wordlikeness: while familiar-looking items were learned more 
quickly than unfamiliar ones, positive affective assessment 
still had a statistically independent influence on learning 
(Abramson, Tasto, and Rychlak, 1969). 
Another strategy for establishing the central role of 
affective assessment in learning was to look at the degree to 
which associations could be generated for trigrams, the 
challenge to LLT being that familiarity of items causes them 
to be liked. Thus, the trigrams more strongly associated with 
words might be both better 1 iked and better learned, not 
because a positive predication facilitates learning, but 
because familiarity, an externally derived, efficient cause, 
drives both liking and learning. This explanation would be 
supported by Zaj one's ( 19 68) research on an 11 enhancement 
effect, 11 whereby sheer frequency of exposure to stimuli 
increased positive ratings of them. 
In contrast to the argument that familiarity underlies 
both liking and learning, later research found that this 
enhancement occurred only when a stimulus was considered to be 
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positive in the first place, and the effect was not seen when 
the items were rated negatively originally (Brickman, 
Redfield, Harrison, and Crandall, 1972). The idea that 
positive predication or liking is not reducible to the 
frequency of presentation, an efficient cause, led Kubat 
(1969) to ask subjects to generate associations for those 
words previously rated on the affective assessment measure. 
This research found no relationship between number of 
associations and positive AA, substantiating the claim of 
independence of predication from pure frequency of contact. 
A third approach to validate the independence of 
affective assessment was to counter the charge that ''liking" 
could be a covert designation of an item as "easy to learn." 
An extensive study done by Rychlak, Flynn, and Burger (1979) 
used factor analyses on data generated by subjects on lists of 
trigrams and/or words rated according to several forms of 
instructions (including AV, AA, easy /hard to learn, 
often/rarely used, easy/hard to pronounce, and others). The 
essentially orthogonal factors that emerged showed two 
dimensions: association value and affective assessment. 
Ratings of "easy/hard to learn" loaded very little on either 
dimension, but less on the AA factor than on the AV factor. 
A second factor analysis cross-validated the independence of 
the AA dimension from the AV dimension. 
The extensive research on AA as an independent influence 
on learning cleared the way for affective assessment as a 
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telic construct to be investigated empirically in its own 
right. The topics in which AA has been found to be 
significant are diverse, including experiments on brain 
lateralization, impression formation, and sharing behavior in 
children. Among these, the field which seems most directly 
relevant to research on mood effects on memory is that 
concerning the process by which a person's basic precedent 
assumptions (e.g. "Life is good" or "I hate myself") are 
extended through affective assessment. 
In this area of research, LLT looks at how attributing 
meaning to items is involved in a person's individual life 
situation. For example, the prediction of learning positive 
items more easily rests on the concept that people usually 
have a precedent, or background view of themselves, their 
lives, and their environment in general as positive. Learning 
of items in the environment is facilitated if a similar 
positive meaning is extended to them. But what if people have 
a negative view of their surroundings or themselves? For 
those with a negative assumption predicating their judgments, 
it should be predicted that negative items, being more 
consistent with that pattern, are learned faster. 
To investigate this, LLT researchers looked at several 
situations in which negative predications were involved: 
mental illness, negative view of self, negative areas of life, 
and negative attitudes towards the task. People with 
psychiatric diagnoses were thought have more negative views of 
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life in general, therefore being more likely to attach meaning 
to and better learn negative items. This hypothesis was 
supported in learning studies involving both acute and 
chronically mentally ill people with mixed diagnoses (Rychlak, 
McKee, Schneider, & Abramson, 1971), and major depression 
patients (Mosbacher, 1984). When these patients were matched 
for age, gender, and social class with normal subjects, it was 
found that the trend to learn positive items to be greatly 
diminished and even reversed in the psychiatric samples. 
Thus, the subjects' precedent negative assumptions were 
sequaciously extended to negatively assessed items, allowing 
learning to take place more easily along negative lines. 
Similar results were found for elementary (August, 
Rychlak, & Felker, 1975; August & Rychlak, 1978) and high-
school (Rychlak, Carlson, & Dunning, 1974) subjects who rated 
their view of themselves on positive/negative dimensions. 
Students who had more positive regard for themselves, i.e. a 
positive predication of themselves, learned ''liked" trigrams 
and words more easily, while those with negative premises 
about themselves learned negatively predicated items more 
easily. 
Another creative approach was to select words to be 
learned from areas of life which subjects previously rated as 
agreeable or distressing, such as competition or interpersonal 
relationships. When words from these domains were affectively 
assessed as positive or negative and subsequently memorized, 
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subjects learned liked words better in those realms seen as 
"good'' (predicated positively) , and disliked words better in 
the "bad" realms (predicated negatively) (Rychlak, Carlson, & 
Dunning, 1974). In another study, the "realm" to be rated was 
the learning task itself, in which subjects affectively 
assessed the task by observing it beforehand. Those who 
disliked the task showed a diminished tendency to learn 
"liked" items quickly, as compared to those who rated the 
learning task as positive (Rychlak & Marceil, 1986). 
This body of research on LLT makes clear the relevance of 
each individual subject's precedent assumptions that are 
brought to the learning task. Whether they involve life in 
general or the task itself, these predications inform the 
learning process: Learning takes place most easily with those 
items to which meaning is extended consistently or congruently 
with the evaluative pattern (positive or negative) that a 
person is already using to assess her surroundings. 
Furthermore, the importance of predication in learning has 
been shown to be independent of purely associative or 
familiarity qualities of items; hence, affective assessment 
effects cannot be "explained away" via these mechanistic 
principles. 
The consistent meaning extension necessary to learning 
would also be expected by LLT to apply to the retrieval of 
already learned material; for example, in the process of 
recall. The positive or negative predications a person uses 
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to organize her experience, including her memory, would frame 
the kinds of memories she recalls. One approach that seemed 
amenable to empirical testing of this hypothesis was that 
suggested by the definition of affect given above: Affect is 
the process of extending basically positive or negative 
meaningfulness to emotional and contextual events. If a 
general affective assessment of these events or surroundings 
is negative, one would say the person is in a negative mood, 
while a generally positive evaluation would place a person in 
a positive mood. 
This brings the topic of mood into LLT' s realm of 
investigation. Before outlining how the present thesis 
empirically investigated the effects of mood on both memory 
and learning, this review turns to the many other studies done 
on the mood/memory interface. 
Research on Mood and Memory 
As mentioned in the theoretical overview above, a large 
amount of research in the area of mood and memory has either 
directly or indirectly involved Bower's (1984) nodal network 
theory of affect. While not all studies cite NNTA as a 
primary source of information or conceptualization, its 
widespread influence warrants the use of its predictions here 
as an organizing format for examining the empirical research 
in the field. This section will therefore outline NNTA' s 
predictions for mood-dependent recall, mood congruency and its 
variants, and the studies testing these phenomena. 
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In the phenomenon of mood dependent recall (MDR), an item 
can be remembered better when a person is in the same mood at 
the time of recall as when the i tern was encoded. Mood 
dependent recall is proposed to occur in the retrieval of both 
naturally occurring events, such as attending a fundraiser, 
and experimentally presented material, such as a word list. 
The phenomenon of MDR is predicted by NNTA because of the 
links that are said to form between an item being encoded and 
the emotion experienced contiguously, at the time of encoding. 
If at a later time, the same emotion node is stimulated, 
activation should spread to the associated item node, priming 
that node and facilitating its threshold activation. 
The first demonstration of an MDR effect was described 
by Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan (1978, experiment 3), in 
which recall of a given target list of words was best when a 
hypnotically induced mood state (happy or sad) during recall 
was the same as that during learning of that list. The MDR 
phenomenon was also observed by Bartlett, Burleson, and 
Santrock (1982, experiment 2), in which they induced moods in 
children by having them think of happy or sad experiences. 
When two separate word lists were learned in differing moods, 
free recall at a later time was best for the list whose mood 
state matched the mood at encoding. Mecklenbrauker and 
Hager's (1984) results showed MDR in subjects whose mood was 
manipulated by the Velten (1968) procedure, a widely-used mood 
induction in which a number of statements are read 
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corresponding to either a happy ("I feel great today!") or sad 
("I'm fed up with it all") mood. In this study, subjects who 
read a story in a negative mood recalled more of the story 
when they were in a negative mood later, as compared to when 
they were in a positive mood. A symmetrical effect was found 
for subjects who read the story in a positive mood; these 
subjects recalled more when in a positive mood later than when 
in a negative mood. Eich and Metcalfe (1989) also found that 
when happy or sad music was played to induce mood, a word list 
was remembered better on a free recall task when mood at 
recall matched mood at encoding, especially when the words to 
be remembered were generated by the subject. 
In the phenomenon of mood congruence, a proposition or 
event is more easily brought to mind because its emotional 
valence is similar to one's current mood. In the more 
particular phenomenon of recall congruency, "subjects' 
thoughts, free associations, fantasies, interpretations, and 
judgments are thematically congruent with their mood state" 
(Singer & Salovey, 1988). Recall congruency is predicted by 
NNTA because the activation of a particular emotion should 
spread to events associated with that emotional tone, 
represented as nodes linked to that emotion node. This 
subthreshold activation or priming of similarly valenced 
memories should lead to more rapid or more frequent retrieval 
of those memories compared to events whose nodes were not 
connected to the currently activated emotion node and thus not 
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previously activated or primed. 
Some early examples of recall congruity include a study 
by Teasdale and Fogarty (1979), in which pleasant memories of 
personal experiences were more quickly recalled by happy 
relative to sad subjects. Similarly, Teasdale and Taylor 
(1981) observed that sad subjects were more likely to recall 
sad memories than happy memories in response to a neutral cue 
word, while happy subjects were more likely to generate happy 
memories. Studies by Natale and Hantas (1982) and Alexander 
and Guenther (1986) both found that happy subjects produced 
more happy memories than sad memories on free recall tasks, 
while sad subjects produced more sad memories. More recently, 
a unique mood induction used by Ehrlichman and Halpern (1988) 
used pleasant and unpleasant odors circulated through a 
laboratory to produce positive and negative moods. They also 
found that subjects in a pleasant mood produced more positive 
memories associated with a neutral cue word, while subjects in 
an unpleasant mood produced more negative memories. 
Another special case of mood congruity is encoding 
congruency (Singer & Salovey, 1988; Blaney, 1986), in which 
events whose emotional loading is similar to the currently 
experienced emotion are more easily learned. In this case, an 
event or item is not yet encoded, but the learning of the item 
is enhanced when it is similar to the themes and associations 
linked to the activated emotion node. For example, if someone 
is in a depressed mood, she might learn negatively-toned words 
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("misery," "unfulfilled") more easily than positively-toned 
words ("joy," "success") , since these can be elaborated in 
terms of concepts already primed by spreading activation from 
the emotion node. 
Several examples of research can be found to support the 
encoding congruency hypothesis. Sad subjects have been found 
to recognize (Natale & Hantas, 1982) and recall (Alexander & 
Guenther, 1986) more negative than positive words from a list 
that had been presented earlier as part of bogus personality 
tests. Both Teasdale and Russell (1983) and Caprara, 
Spizzichino, and Romeo (1989) produced similar results: Sad 
subjects recalled more negative words from a word list learned 
previously in a neutral mood, while happy subjects recalled 
more positive words. Brown and Taylor (1986) found that 
positive words were recalled more easily than negative words 
by happy subjects. Rinck, Glowalla, and Schneider ( 1992) 
demonstrated mood congruence in the learning of words with a 
strong emotional valence on a free recall task. In a related 
experiment, Small (1985) demonstrated the effect of mood on 
basic levels of cognitive processing, by showing that on a 
tachistoscopic recognition task negatively-toned words 
congruent with a negative mood were recognized at lower time 
thresholds than positive words. 
While the phenomena of MDR and mood congruence appear to 
be clearly defined and demonstrated in a variety of settings, 
the literature also contains many studies in which these 
effects were not so clearly demonstrated. 
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A view of these 
conflicting results will bring us to the rationale of the 
present study. 
The occurrence of MDR appears not to be as robust as 
Bower and other researchers first believed. Bartlett, 
Burleson, and Santrock (1982, Experiment 1) found that, in 
contrast to their second experiment, when children relaxed 
rather than played with puzzles before mood inductions (via 
thinking of happy and sad experiences), no MDR effects emerged 
on learning of word lists. Wetzler (1985) also reported no 
facilitation of word list learning when the mood at recall 
matched the mood at learning. In fact, Bower and Mayer (1985) 
could not replicate MDR effects using the same procedure as in 
the original Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan (1978) study. In 
Brown and Taylor's (1986) study, neither phonemically rated 
("rhymes with XXX?") nor self-referenced ("describes you?") 
traits were recalled better when mood at learning and recall 
were matched. No MDR was seen in Eich and Metcalfe's (1989) 
study when subjects were asked to recognize rather than recall 
words learned in similar as opposed to different moods. 
Another challenge to predictions of MDR comes from the 
unique study of Lewis and Williams (1989), who examined mood 
dependent recall and mood congruent recall simultaneously. 
The central feature of the study was the composition of the 
list of words to be learned out of words previously rated by 
subjects on the affective assessment measure used in LLT 
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research. When these words were learned by subjects who were 
induced into positive or negative moods by hypnosis, both mood 
congruent and mood dependent recall of words were later 
observed. However, MOR was only observed for those i terns 
which were congruent with the subject's mood at recall. In 
other words, mood congruity appeared to be underlying the MOR 
effects. 
While mood congruity has appeared to be a more robust 
phenomenon that mood dependent recall, some research has 
demonstrated an inconsistency of mood congruency effects. 
Mecklenbrauker and Hager (1984) found no congruency between 
the emotional valence of information recalled about a story 
and the emotions experienced by subjects. Hasher, Rose, 
Zacks, Sanft, & Doren {1985) found that when subjects were 
divided into happy and sad groups according to their naturally 
occurring moods, rather than by experimentally induced mood, 
no congruency occurred between story information recalled and 
experienced mood. Clark and Teasdale {1985) found mood 
congruency effects for women on a free recall task, but not 
for men. Macleod, Tata, and Mathews (1987) also found that 
identification of words on a lexical decision task was not 
influenced by a match between the item's emotional valence and 
subjects' mood, while Small and Robins {1988) found that on a 
lexical decision task, subjects induced to be depressed 
recognized both dysphoric and elated content words at briefer 
exposures than neutral words. 
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There have also been findings of a reversal of the mood 
congruency effect. For example, Brown and Taylor ( 1986) found 
that sad subjects learned positive words faster than negative 
words on a free recall task. Rinck, Glowalla, and Schneider 
(1992) also found mood incongruent learning for words that 
were slightly emotionally toned as opposed to highly emotional 
words. Similarly, an extensive study by Parrott and Sabini 
(1990) found that in both naturally occurring moods and 
experimentally induced moods, the first of three 
autobiographical memories produced by subjects tended to have 
the opposite emotional tone as the currently experienced 
emotion. In other words, a happy subject would first produce 
a sad memory, while a sad subject first produced a happy 
memory. 
As shown by this review of studies on mood and memory 
phenomena, several challenges and inconsistencies have not yet 
been resolved. Several explanations have been suggested for 
failures to replicate findings on MOR, including experimenter 
bias, procedural differences in experiments, and type of mood 
induction (Bower and Mayer, 1985: Mayer and Bower, 1985). 
While these explanations have generally been in favor of 
preserving the NNTA model, Bower and Mayer (1985) also 
acknowledge that the evanescent quality of MOR as a phenomenon 
may challenge the theory that predicts it: 
"The failure to find an MDR effect impacts negatively 
upon many theories that expect it. It not only 
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contradicts Bower's (1981) specific theory of mood as an 
active retrieval cue, the failure impacts more generally 
upon any theory that supposes that internal states act as 
contexts that can become associated with memories of 
coincident events and can cue retrieval of them" (p. 42). 
Mayer and Bower (1985) also suggest that the phenomenon of MDR 
may only be observed when the subject perceives her mood as 
"causally belonging" to the to-be-remembered item, rather than 
mood and i tern being merely coincident events. In other 
words, the subject must view the item as causing the mood in 
some way. This explanation adds a factor not previously 
addressed by the core propositions of NNTA: the attributions 
of the subject in the experiment. Mere contiguity of mood and 
event does not lead to consistently observed association 
between them, thus necessitating an additional explanatory 
construct in NNTA. The "causal belongingness" added here 
almost resembles a pattern of relationships between stimuli 
which must be formulated by the subject. This is a concept on 
a completely different level than the automatic firing of 
nodes to cue associated memories. In fact, it suggests a hint 
of formal causation which is otherwise quite foreign to NNTA. 
While Bower and Mayer (1985) saw the lack of consistency 
for MDR effects as "assuredly an unhappy and thoroughly 
regrettable state of affairs," Logical Learning Theory has 
something more positive to offer. As Lewis and Williams 
(1984) demonstrated, the idiographic patterns of predication 
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of the subject are central in learning and memory. These 
evaluations are not added to LLT, they make up the pivotal 
process that formulate all aspects of experience, including 
words, events, and mood itself. The present thesis was 
designed to examine the interplay of mood, memory, and 
learning, with predicational patterns included in theory and 
methodology from the start, rather than included as an 
afterthought. The development, rationale, and predictions of 
the study are outlined in the next section areas, particularly 
that of mood incongruent recall as found by Parrott and Sabini 
(1990). 
CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Introduction to the Present study 
The present study views affect from a Logical Learning 
Theory ( LLT) perspective. To quote Rychlak (in press) , 
"Affective assessment is a transcending telosponse; that is, 
an innate capacity to reflexively target and thereby evaluate 
the meanings of one's cognitive contents (premises, concepts, 
predicates, etc.) characterizing them as either liked 
(positive evaluation) or disliked (negative evaluation) in 
quality. Logical learning theory holds that affection is the 
most basic and abstract cognition carried on by a human 
being". According to LLT, all contextual material and 
emotional experience is predicated by the most basic of 
precedent assumptions, that of affect. Therefore, the results 
brought to J.F. Rychlak's attention personally by W.G. Parrott 
came somewhat as a surprise. The challenge to LLT was that in 
Parrott and Sabini's (1990) Experiment 4, the first of three 
memories on a recall task was sad or negative for subjects who 
were in happy moods (seen in LLT to be a positive 
predication), while this first memory was happy or positive 
for subjects in sad moods. In contrast to this mood 
incongruency of the first memory, LLT would predict that the 
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pattern of positive meaning of a subject's mood would have 
been more readily extended in a recall of a positive memory. 
After studying Parrott and Sabini's (1990) experiments, 
Rychlak and this writer pinpointed several areas, particularly 
with regard to scoring, in which further study could 
facilitate an understanding of these results in light of LLT. 
Specifically, Parrott and Sabini (1990) obtained a measure of 
positive and negative affect of recalled memories from two 
independent judges, not from subjects. From an LLT standpoint, 
the idiographic, personal evaluation of the subjects 
themselves would be a more valid measure of the affective 
quality of these subjects' memories. In addition, it seemed 
that Parrott and Sabini (1990) viewed "positive" and 
"negative" as two separate constructs which were therefore 
scored by judges on two independent scales. Similarly, 
"happy" and "sad" were isolated in mood measurements as two 
separate scales. In contrast, LLT regards "positive/negative" 
and "happy/ sad" as oppositional, inherently connected concepts 
which are more appropriately measured on a bipolar dimension, 
with "more positive (or happy)" intrinsically implying "less 
negative (or sad)." 
This thesis was therefore planned as a partial 
replication of the mood and memory studies of Parrott and 
Sabini (1990), in which these researchers' methods would be 
utilized. In addition, however, the subjects' own 
predications and the oppositionality of the frameworks 
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themselves would be recognized and measured. 
The thesis also extends LLT's examination of mood 
congruity beyond recall of memory to the realm of learning 
itself. Predication, the central concept of LLT, is a formal 
and final cause process which has been tested in numerous 
other areas of learning. This study was intended to address 
the area of mood and learning, in which the material and 
efficient causation of NNTA has been suggested to be an 
insufficient explanation (Bower & Mayer, 1985). The 
following hypotheses and the rationales behind each one 
outline the predictions of the thesis. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: It is predicted that positively and negatively 
toned music will serve as a context which people use when 
evaluating their mood. 
A. People will become more happy/less sad after listening 
to happy music. 
B. People will become more sad/ less happy after listening 
to sad music. 
C. People who listen to happy music will be more 
happy/less sad than people who listen to sad music or 
people who do not listen to music. 
D. People who listen to sad music will be more sad/less 
happy than people who listen to happy music or do not 
listen to music. 
E. The predictions A through D above will be supported 
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in both Parts I and II of the experiment. 
Rationale: In order to replicate Parrott and Sabini's (1990) 
Experiment 4 as closely as possible, similar musical programs 
and measurements of subjects' mood were used in this thesis. 
Yet, the predictions, understanding and explanation of 
observable phenomena are based on LLT's principles. As noted 
above, LLT regards predication as a basic process which occurs 
in the understanding of all personal contexts and experiences. 
Methodologically, this means that when a prominent context 
such as music is presented to a subject, she will affectively 
assess that context as positive or negative, depending on her 
musical preferences. A positively predicated context or 
background will serve as a framing pattern whose positive 
meaning is sequaciously, immediately extended to include other 
experiences within that context, such as the present mood 
state. In contrast, a negatively predicated musical context 
will be used by the subject to frame experiences negatively. 
It is important to note that while the experimenter presented 
musical programs which she assumed (based on pilot testing) to 
be positive or negative, it was up to the subject to actually 
predicate this context as positive or negative. For example, 
a person's natural evaluation of the experimental context or 
her general mood may be a more personally relevant framework 
for organizing her recollections. It was therefore necessary 
to test this hypothesis in both parts of the experiment before 
assuming that the methodological manipulation of mood via 
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music was successful. 
Hypothesis II. It is predicted that mood will not change as 
a result of recalling memories. 
Rationale: This hypothesis addresses Parrott and Sabini's 
(1990) explanation of their mood incongruent findings. Their 
thought was that a positive or negative memory may be recalled 
in contrast to a negative or positive mood, respectively, in 
order to balance or "repair" the mood and keep it from 
becoming too extreme. While this formulation does have an 
intentional ring to it, LLT does not view predication as 
itself caused or pushed by drives to maintain equilibrium in 
any realm, 
telosponse 
including emotion. 
which is done for 
Instead, predication is the 
the sake of the targeted 
experience to be understood. Therefore, LLT rejects the 
prediction that recalling memories will act as an efficient 
cause to change a person's mood over time. 
Hypothesis III: It is predicted that people will recall events 
that are congruent in affective value with their current mood 
state. All three memories recalled by people in a happy mood 
will be more positive/less negative than those recalled by 
people in a sad or neutral mood, while memories recalled by 
people in a sad mood will be more negative/less positive than 
those recalled by happy or neutral subjects. This prediction 
will be supported only when subjects' own predications and the 
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inherent oppositionality of positivity/negativity are taken 
into account: 
A. Mood congruency will be observed when subjects rate 
the memories on a single, overall scale in which 
positivity and negativity are at opposite ends of the 
bipolarity. 
B. Mood congruency will not be observed when subjects 
rate the memories according to how positive they are or 
how negative they are on separate scales. 
c. Mood congruency will not be observed when independent 
judges rate the memories according to how positive or 
negative they are on a single scale. 
D. Mood congruency will not be observed when independent 
judges rate the memories according to how positive they 
are and how negative they are on separate scales. 
Rationale: Assuming a successful methodology in which subjects 
do take on positive or negative moods, this hypothesis relies 
on the subjects' use of mood as a predication itself. A happy 
mood would be seen by LLT as a positive framework which would 
predicate tasks targeted by the subject. If that task is to 
recall a memory from the recent past, LLT predicts that the 
meaning of the precedent assumption ("I feel happy," "Life 
looks pretty good," etc.) will be more readily extended to 
memories which themselves have been positively assessed. In 
contrast, a sad or depressed mood would be a negative 
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predication which frames recollections consistent with that 
sad organization of memory. This consistent, congruent 
predication would hold for the retrieval of each of the three 
memories requested of the subjects; unlike Parrott and 
sabini's {1990) mood incongruency, which occured only on the 
first of three memories, this hypothesis predicted that all 
three memories would be congruent with the framing predication 
of mood. 
However, as discussed above, this predication is 
fundamentally idiographic: the person who recalls the event 
simultaneously "takes a stand" on the material and judges it. 
Therefore, the congruity between the affect of the event and 
the mood which frames it will only be apparent when the 
individual predication of each subject is examined, by asking 
them about that affect. Furthermore, LLT emphasizes the 
intrinsic oppositionality of the "positive/negative" 
dimension. It is therefore expected that "independent" 
ratings of what are essentially "two sides of the same coin" 
will obscure any apparent congruity between mood and memory. 
Here the fundamental differences become clear between the 
explanations of observed phenomena given by LLT and Lockean 
theories: A Lockean model may not inherently distinguish 
between the "first person" perspective of the subject and the 
"third person" perspective of a judge in rating the "object" 
of a memory. Neither would a Lockean model attribute as much 
importance to the oppositional nature of any concept, instead 
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viewing independent ratings of "positive" and "negative" as 
more closely approximating the elements of reality. 
Hypothesis IV: It is predicted that people will better learn 
those items that are affectively congruent (as individually 
assessed} with their current mood state. 
A. People in neutral and happy moods will learn 
positively assessed, or "liked" items more quickly and 
accurately than they learn negatively assessed or 
"disliked" items. 
B. People in a sad mood will learn "disliked" items more 
quickly and accurately than they learn "liked" items. 
Rationale: Just as mood is seen as a predication for framing 
the meaning and affective quality of recalled memories, the 
predicational nature of happy and sad moods is also predicted 
to serve as an organizing frame for learning new material. As 
has been demonstrated by the extensive LLT research on 
learning (e.g. Rychlak, McKee, Schneider, & Abramson, 1971; 
Mosbacher, 1984), the precedent assumptions brought by the 
subject to a task have a direct influence on the organization 
and learning of affectively assessed material. This 
hypothesis is therefore an extension of previous research 
showing that depressives (Mosbacher, 1984) and low self-esteem 
(Rychlak, Carlson, & Dunning, 1974) subjects use their 
negative predications to extend meaningfulness more readily 
toward negative items in their experience, while non-depressed 
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or positively predicating subjects extend meaningfulness more 
easily along positive lines. It is then predicted that 
experimentally-induced mood will also serve as a predication 
which facilitates learning of items assessed as consistent or 
congruent with the framework, as compared to those that are 
assessed as inconsistent. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 68 females and 22 males who participated in 
the experiment as part of an Introductory Psychology course 
requirement. Subjects were informed in the sign-up sheet that 
they were agreeing to participate in a two-day experiment, and 
were allowed to select the times that would be most convenient 
for them. Of the 142 people who signed up for the experiment, 
the 90 subjects who completed the entire experiment were 
included in the analyses. Fifty-two subjects were excluded 
for the following reasons: failure to show up for or complete 
Part II of the experiment (30 subjects), experimenter or 
equipment error (e.g., incorrect administration of learning 
task; 12 subjects), failure to complete or insufficient 
completion of forms in Part I of the experiment (10 subjects). 
Materials 
Mood was induced using the musical mood induction 
procedure (MMIP), employed in previous studies, as well as by 
recent pilot testing by the writer, as an effective mood 
enhancer (Parrott & Sabini, 1990; Clark & Teasdale, 1985). 
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The MMIP consists of audiotaped music which has either a 
"happy" or "sad" emotional tone, to which a subject listens 
for a specified amount of time. Some research using the MMIP 
(e.g., Parrott & Sabini, 1990, Experiment 3) has instructed 
subjects to use the music to "get into" a designated mood. 
However, the present study followed Parrott and Sabini' s 
Experiment 4 (1990) in eliminating such explicit mood 
specifications, in order to avoid demand characteristics which 
might influence subjects to provide mood-congruent memories 
only to please the experimenter. In addition, eliminating 
instructions to "get into mood X" allows the subject to use 
the music to frame his or her environment individually and 
personally, rather than as explicitly defined by the 
experimenter. 
Accordingly, the MMIP used in this experiment consisted 
of two approximately 60-minute music programs, one designated 
happy, one sad. For each program, the same music used by 
Parrott & Sabini (1990) was used, and additional music was 
also selected for its positive or negative overtones. In order 
to avoid confounding the mood type of the music with any 
specific memories that the subject relates to a specific piece 
of music, and to avoid the semantic cues that could arise from 
song lyrics, music was selected that does not contain lyrics 
and that was not likely to have been popular during the 
subjects' high school years. A list of titles and segment 
lengths for each program can be found in Appendix A. 
The Mood Assessment (MA) 
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instrument measured the 
subjects' actual mood in a manner similar to that used by 
Clark and Teasdale (1985) and Parrott and Sabini (1990). The 
subject rated to what extent 11 adjectives describe her/his 
mood at the present moment, using a rating scale anchored by 
not at all (1), moderately (4), and extremely (7). Four 
scales (happiness, sadness, uncertainty, and anxiety) are 
derived from the measure by averaging appropriate items. 
Subjects' scores on the happiness scale and on the sadness 
scale were used in the data analyses. The items and scales 
for the MA can be found in Appendix B. 
The High-School Memory (HSM) task is an event recall task 
consisting of a form on which the subject is instructed to 
describe, in writing, three specific events that happened 
during his/her high school years. The HSM also instructs 
subjects to describe their feelings at the time of the event. 
The form for the HSM can be found in Appendix c. 
Subjects rated each memory given on the HSM using three 
different scoring systems, as instructed by three forms. The 
first two forms used a rating process similar to that of 
Parrott and Sabini (1990), in which subjects rated how 
positive the event was (Positivity Scale) separately from 
how negative it was (Negativity Scale). Each form uses an 
individual rating dimension, with the Positivity Scale 
anchored by not at all positive (1), moderately positive (4) 
and extremely positive (7), and the Negativity Scale anchored 
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by not at all negative (1) moderately negative (4) and 
extremely negative (7). subjects were also asked to rate the 
memory on an Overall Scale, according to how positive or 
negative the event was in general, using a dimension ranging 
from extremely negative (1) to extremely positive (7). These 
three scales can be found in Appendices D, E, and F, 
respectively. 
The items to be learned in Part II were selected from 
Rychlak' s ( 1966) Phonetic Preference Inventory CPPI). This is 
a list of 140 consonant-vowel-consonant trigrams selected from 
Archer's ( 1960) norms. The norms assign each trigram an 
association value (AV) score according to the proportion of 
people who associated a wordlike quality to that trigram. The 
trigrams presented in the PPI trigrams were selected from the 
middle range of the Archer norms (44-78% AV). Subjects in 
this study rated how much they like each trigram on a 4-step 
dichotomous dimension, with possible ratings of "like much," 
"like slightly," "dislike slightly," or "dislike much." From 
the PPI, which was administered twice in Part I, eight 
reliably liked and eight reliably disliked trigrams were 
selected to make up an individualized list of four liked pairs 
and four disliked pairs of trigrams for each subject. The PPI 
can be found in Appendix G. 
The Tennessee Self-Concept Inventory CTSCI) served as a 
distractor task between the two ratings of the PPI. This 
inventory consists of 100 self-descriptive statements which 
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the subject rates on a scale with anchors of completely false 
(1) to completely true (5). The scales yielded by the TSCI 
were not employed in data analyses. 
A Music Rating Inventory (MRI) was used to allow subjects 
to "rate the auditory stimuli" as instructed. The MRI asked 
subjects to identify any of the music that they were familiar 
with, and to rate the music program on its loudness, on how 
distracting it was with respect to the other tasks, and on any 
emotions that may have been elicited. As this inventory was 
provided only to facilitate the procedure outlined below, none 
of these ratings were used in data analyses. A copy of the 
MRI can be found in Appendix H. 
The eight pairs of trigrams were learned in Part II of 
the experiment using a memory drum in which one trigram at a 
time can be viewed in an open window, at two-second intervals. 
The list of eight trigrams was presented by showing the 
trigrams of a pair consecutively for one second each, with a 
two-second blank space appearing between pairs. The memory 
drum's four windows enable the list of pairs to be presented 
in four different randomized orders, to avoid a subject's use 
of serial position cues to facilitate learning. The accuracy 
of each subject's responses were recorded on an individualized 
score sheet, which can be found in Appendix I. 
Procedure 
The procedure and design used in the present thesis is 
outlined in the flow chart in Figure 1, and described below. 
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FIGURE 1 
PROCEDURAL FLOW CHART 
Part I Procedure 
Happy and Sad Conditions 
(30 Subjects in each group) 
Rate mood {MAl) 
Hear happy or sad music {MMIP) 
Rate mood {MA2) 
Recall three memories 
{HSM) 
Rate mood {MA3) 
Assess trigrams {PPil) 
Rate affect of memories 
{P and N Scales) 
Complete "filler task" 
{TSCS) 
Assess trigrams {PPI2) 
Rate affect of memories 
{O Scale) 
Rate "auditory stimuli" {MRI) 
Between Parts I and II 
Neutral Conditions 
(30 Subjects) 
Rate mood {MA2) 
Recall three memories 
{HSM) 
Rate mood {MAJ) 
Assess trigrams {PPil) 
Rate affect of memories 
{P and N Scales) 
Complete "filler task" 
{TSCS) 
Assess trigrams {PPI2) 
Rate affect of memories 
{O Scale) 
Experimenter prepares individualized trigram lists 
Part II Procedure 
Happy and Sad Conditions 
(30 Subjects in each group)* 
Rate mood {MA4) 
Hear happy or sad music {MMIP) 
Rate mood {MAS) 
Learn trigram list 
Rate "auditory stimuli" {MRI) 
Debriefing 
Neutral Condition 
(30 Subjects)* 
Rate mood {MAS) 
Learn trigram list 
Debriefing 
*10 Subjects each from Part I's Happy, Sad, and Neutral 
conditions. 
Post Experiment: 
Judges rate memories {Parrott and Sabini [1990) method) 
Judges rate memories {Overall method) 
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Part I 
Part I took place on the first day of the experiment. 
After anonymity and confidentiality had been guaranteed and 
the subjects had consented to participate, they were told that 
several experiments would be taking place over the two day 
period. For subjects assigned to a mood condition, reference 
was made to the rating of auditory stimuli in "the present 
experiment." For all subjects, experiments on memory recall 
and trigram rating were mentioned. Mood was then assessed for 
the first time using the Mood Assessment {MAl). 
Following this introduction, those subjects assigned to 
a mood condition were instructed to listen to the music which 
they would be rating after a delay period. They were asked to 
refrain from talking so that everyone in the group could 
experience the music as fully and deeply as possible, and were 
told not to think about evaluation of the auditory stimuli at 
this time, but simply to relax and listen to the music. They 
were also informed that after about eight minutes of music, 
the "filler tasks," related to the other experiments, would be 
administered to assure that all subjects participated in the 
same activities during the delay. Either the "happy" or "sad" 
MMIP program was then played, during which the experimenter 
was present to assure that subjects did not interact with each 
other. 
After eight minutes, a packet was distributed which 
contained the following materials, in order of appearance: 
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Mood Assessment {MA2) ; HSM; Mood Assessment (MA3) ; PPI 1; 
positivity and Negativity Scales (counterbalanced for order 
across subjects); TSCI; PPI2. Subjects were allowed to work 
at their own pace on the packet, and upon completion were 
administered the Overall Scale for rating the memories 
(without being allowed to refer to their other ratings) and 
the Music Rating Inventory. In the experimental groups, the 
MMIP music continued to play as all the above tasks were 
completed. 
Those subjects assigned to the Neutral mood condition did 
not hear any music; rather, they were administered the packet 
of materials directly following the introduction to the 
experiment. They also received the Overall Scale for memory 
rating upon completion of the packet, but the Music Rating 
Inventory was eliminated. 
Between Parts I and II, the individualized list of eight 
trigram pairs (four reliably liked pairs, four reliably 
disliked pairs) was constructed for each subject by the 
experimenter for use on the learning task of Part II. 
Part II 
In Part II, which took place on the day directly after 
Part I, each subject was tested individually. If the subject 
did not listen to music in Part I, and was assigned to a mood 
condition in Part II, the "auditory stimuli" experiment was 
explained as in Part I. After all subjects were reminded of 
the several experiments taking place across the two days, the 
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subject's mood was assessed (MA4). Each of the subjects who 
were assigned to a mood condition listened to eight minutes of 
music, this time with the experimenter out of the room. A 
final mood assessment {MAS) was followed by the learning task. 
subjects assigned to the Neutral condition began the learning 
task directly after the fourth mood assessment (MA4). Music 
continued to be played in the mood conditions as the learning 
task was administered. 
The paired associate learning task used a method of 
instructions of the following anticipation. Detailed 
processes were provided orally to each subject along with 
examples, and all questions were answered prior to beginning 
the trials. In the open window of the memory drum, each 
trigram in the list of pairs was presented individually, and 
the subject said each trigram aloud in whatever pronunciation 
s/he preferred, relating the pairs by saying "goes with" 
between their individual appearances. For example, the first 
pair might be pronounced as "RAJ goes with ... PIB." After all 
eight pairs had been pronounced in this way, the subject moved 
to the next window, 
presented with the 
in which the same list of pairs was 
pairs in a different order. Each 
presentation of the entire list was considered a trial. 
Learning of a pair was indicated by the subject's using the 
first trigram of a pair as a cue to correctly name the second 
trigram of the pair before it appeared in the window. The 
experimenter kept track of correctly named pairs as the trials 
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continued, until the subject could correctly name all the 
pairs in ~ row on two consecutive trials. At this point, the 
subject was considered to have learned the entire list and was 
congratulated. A final music evaluation was administered for 
subjects in the mood conditions. 
The debriefing, which concluded the testing session, 
included a discussion of the intent of each step of the 
experiment, the hypotheses being tested, a presentation of the 
results of the subject's learning trials and description of 
any observed patterns, and an opportunity to ask questions 
about the experiment and the theory behind it. Verbatim 
instructions for administering Parts I and II of the 
experiment can be found in Appendix J. 
Two independent judges were trained on Parrott & Sabini' s 
(1990) coding system, which was provided via personal 
communication with the author. According to this method, each 
memory reported on the HSM was scored by these judges on both 
"Positivity" and "Negativity." The judges remained blind to 
the experimental condition of each subject, and the average 
score of each memory was used in data analysis. In addition, 
two additional judges were trained to score each memory on how 
positive or negative it is "Overall." This method was 
adapted from the scoring system developed by Parrott and 
Sabini (1990). Directions for both methods of scoring can be 
found in Appendices K and L, respectively. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Part I. 
Manipulation Check 
Hypothesis I predicted that positively and negatively 
toned music would serve as a context which people use when 
assessing their mood. Specifically, it was expected that 
subjects' mood ratings would be more happy and less sad when 
mood is rated in the context of happy music. Also, ratings 
are expected to be more sad and less happy when mood is rated 
in the context of sad music. This hypothesis was tested each 
time the musical mood induction procedure (MMIP) was employed, 
in Parts I and II of the experiment, in order to test the 
effectiveness of the experimental manipulation of mood. The 
results are presented and discussed in order of the procedure 
of the study. 
To test Hypothesis I for Part I of the experiment, the 
dependent variable was subjects' mood as measured by the two 
scales, happiness and sadness, as derived from the first two 
mood ratings (MAl and MA2; see Table 1). A higher score on 
the happiness scale, which ranged from 1 to 7, indicated a 
happier mood for the subject, while a higher score on the 
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sadness scale, which also ranged from 1 to 7, indicated a 
sadder mood. 
TABLE 1 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) OF MOOD SCALES, 
PART I 
MOOD SCALES 
MOOD 
CONDITIONS Happiness Sadness 
Happy Before MMIP 4.04 ( 1. 18) 2.26 (1.10) 
After MMIP 4.34 ( 1. 13) 2.17 (1.25) 
After Memories 4.23 (1.29) 2.21 (1.25) 
Sad Before MMIP 3.49 ( 1. 22) 2.41 (1.42) 
After MMIP 2.86 (0.95) 3.04 ( 1. 42) 
After Memories 2.98 ( 1. 04) 3.23 ( 1. 62) 
Neutral Before MMIP 3.80 ( 1. 06) 2.66 ( 1. 43) 
After MMIP 3.80 ( 1. 06) 2.66 ( 1. 43) 
After Memories 3.98 ( 1. 07) 2.76 (1.46) 
Note. Higher scores on the happiness scale indicate a happier 
mood, whereas higher scores on the sadness scale indicate a 
sadder mood. 
The scale scores for happiness and sadness at each time 
of measurement were entered into a repeated-measures 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). The design had 
one between-subjects variable, mood condition (happy music, 
sad music, or no music) and two within-subjects variables: 
time of measurement (before and after the MMIP) and mood scale 
(happiness scale and sadness scale). Subjects who did not 
hear music only rated mood once (MA2) before the memory task. 
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For these subjects, both the "before MMIP" and "after MMIP" 
mood ratings were considered in the following analyses to be 
identical to this single rating. According to Hypothesis I, 
a three-way interaction should occur, indicating that changes 
in mood ratings at different times of measurement should vary 
relative to the mood condition and relative to the mood scale. 
As predicted, there was a significant three-way 
interaction between mood condition, time of measurement, and 
mood scale, ,E(l,87)=9.02, 2<.001. Analysis of the simple 
interaction of mood condition and time of measurement, when 
the type of mood scale was held constant, showed significance 
for ratings of happiness, .E(2,87)=10.00, 2<.001. This simple 
interaction was also significant for ratings of sadness, 
.E(2,87)=5.00, 2<.0l. 
In order to test corollaries A and B of Hypothesis I, 
which predicted that the MMIP itself was effective in 
manipulating subjects' mood, the next step was to analyze the 
simple simple main effect of the time of measurement variable, 
when mood condition was held constant. For subjects in the 
sad mood condition, ratings of happiness after the sad music 
were lower (M=2.86) than they had been at the beginning of the 
experiment (M=3.49; .f(l,29]=10.59, 2<.0l), while ratings of 
sadness after the MMIP (M=3.04) were higher than before the 
music (M=2.41; .f(l,29)=7.00, 2<.05). For subjects in the 
happy mood condition, there was a trend toward significance 
for the increase in ratings of happiness after the happy MMIP 
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CM=4.34} as compared to after the music (M=4.04; f'.(1,29}=2.98, 
R<.10]. In this group, however, ratings of sadness after the 
MMIP (M=2.17} were not significantly lower than before the 
happy music (M=2.26; f'.(1.29}=.22, R=.642}. 
The results of this analysis support corollaries A and B 
of Hypothesis I that music will be a context taken into 
account as subjects assess their mood: Subjects who heard 
happy music tended to become more happy (but not more sad}, 
while subjects who heard sad music became both less happy and 
more sad. The sad music thus appeared to be seen as a more 
powerful context for subjects than did the happy music. 
To address corollaries c and D of Hypothesis I, that 
subjects of different groups will differ in mood depending on 
the mood condition assigned, a second examination of the 
simple interaction between mood condition and time of 
measurement was undertaken. An analysis of the simple simple 
effects of mood condition at each time of measurement revealed 
that before the MMIP, subjects in the three different 
conditions were not significantly different on either 
happiness, f'.(2,87}=1.75, R>.15; or sadness, f'.(2,87)=.73, 
R>.45. However, after the respective MMIPs, there was a 
significant difference between groups for happiness, 
f'.(2,87}=15.47, R<.001; and a trend toward significance for 
sadness, f'.(2,87}=3.10, R<.06. 
Follow-up t-tests revealed that subjects who heard happy 
music rated happiness significantly higher (M=4.34} than 
73 
subjects hearing sad music (M=2.86; !;(58)=5.53, R<.001). 
similarly, in this happy MMIP condition, sadness was rated 
significantly lower (M=2.17) than in the sad MMIP condition 
(M=3.04; !;(58)=-2.55, R<.05). Subjects who heard sad music 
also rated happiness significantly lower (M=2.86) than did 
subjects who heard no music (M=3.80; !;(58)=-3.64, R<.01), but 
did not rate sadness (M=3.04) as significantly different from 
subjects who heard no music (M=2.67; !;(58)=1.02, R=.310). 
There was a trend toward significance for the difference in 
happiness ratings between subjects in the happy mood condition 
(M=4.34) and subjects who heard no music (M=3.80; !;(58)=1.53, 
R<. 07) . However, there was no significant difference on 
sadness ratings between those subjects who heard happy music 
(M=2.17) and those who did not hear music (M=2.67; !;(58)= 
-1. 44, R<. 20) . 
These results are interpreted as showing that subjects 
who heard music in Part I of the experiment not only changed 
their moods in a direction consistent with the musical 
context, but that this change also resulted in significant 
differences between groups, depending on the type of music 
heard. Thus, corollaries c and D of Hypothesis I are 
supported: Subjects hearing happy music were observably more 
happy and less sad than subjects hearing sad music, who 
assessed their mood as more sad and less happy. Inspection of 
these means also shows that after the happy music, subjects 
rated themselves above the midpoint of 4 on the happiness 
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rating scale, and below the midpoint of 4 on the sadness 
scale. In contrast, after the sad MMIP, subjects in the sad 
mood condition rated happiness below that scale's midpoint of 
4, while their ratings on the sadness scale neared the 
midpoint of 4. Hypothesis I is seen as being supported in its 
prediction that subjects use music as a context for assessing 
their mood. 
To test the prediction of Hypothesis II that mood ratings 
should not change as a result of recalling emotionally toned 
memories, the mood ratings before and after the memory task 
(MA2 and MA3) were compared (see Table 1). The scale scores 
for happiness and sadness at each time of measurement were 
entered into a repeated-measures MANOVA. The design had one 
between-subjects variable, mood condition (happy music, sad 
music, and no music) and two within-subjects variables: time 
of measurement (before and after the MMIP) and mood scale 
(happiness and sadness). All subjects, including those who 
did not hear music, rated their moods before and after the 
memory task, and both ratings were used in the following 
analyses. If Hypothesis II is correct, there should be no 
signif icany effect for time of measurement alone or in 
interaction with the other variables, since the task 
intervening between the two mood assessments was not predicted 
to affect subjects' mood. 
As predicted, no significant effects were found for the 
time of measurement variable before or after the memory task: 
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the three-way interaction was not significant, l(2,87)=.07, 
R>.93, nor were there significant interactions of time of 
measurement with mood scale, l(l,87)=.24, R>.60; or with mood 
condition, l(2,87)=1.12, R>.30. The main effect of time of 
measurement was also nonsignificant, l(l,87)=1.74, p<.20. 
These results support Hypothesis III, which predicted that 
mood will not change as a result of recalling memories. 
Mood and Memories 
Hypothesis III predicted that people would recall events 
which were congruent in affective value with their current 
assessment of their mood. To test this hypothesis, both the 
subjects' own ratings of recalled events and the ratings of 
trained judges were employed. 
Subject Ratings 
The subjects' ratings of their memories on the overall, 
global scale of the dimension "positivity/negativity" were 
investigated separately from their independent ratings on the 
positivity and the negativity scales. 
To test corollary A of Hypothesis III, which predicted 
mood congruency of memories when affect was rated on an 
oppositional dimension, the overall scale of positivity/ 
negativity of the memories was used as the dependent variable. 
The scale ranged from 1 to 7, with a score above the midpoint 
of 4 meaning a more positive affective quality of the memory, 
and a score below the midpoint meaning a more negative 
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affective quality. Ratings were made on this scale for each 
of the three memories recalled by subjects on the High School 
Memory task (see Table 2). 
TABLE 2 
SUBJECT MEMORY RATINGS: 
OVERALL AFFECT 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
POSITIVITY/NEGATIVITY 
Memory 
MOOD 
CONDITIONS 1 2 3 
Happy 5.63 5.17 5.24 
(1.70) (2.24) ( 1. 92) 
Sad 4.87 4.63 3.70 
(1.96) (2.37) (2.63) 
Neutral 5.07 5.07 4.93 
(2.23) (2.24) (2.26) 
Note: Higher scores indicate more positive 
affect; lower scores indicate more negative 
affect. 
Subject ratings of each memory on this overall scale were 
entered into a repeated measures MANOVA with one between-
subjects variable (happy, sad, neutral mood condition) and one 
within-subjects variable (first, second, or third memory 
recalled by each subject). According to corollary A of 
Hypothesis III, the subjects' idiographic ratings using an 
oppositional scale should lead to an observation of mood 
congruency, as evident in a significant effect of mood 
condition. In addition, no effects of memory number were 
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expected, either in interaction with the other variables or as 
a main effect. 
This analysis showed no effects of an interaction between 
mood condition and memory number, Hotelling's ~2=.025, 
f(4,166)=.52, 2>.71. No main effects were observed for mood 
condition, f(2,85)=1.83, 2>.16, or for memory number, 
Hotelling's ~2=.04, f(2,84)=1.73, 2>.18 (see Figure 2). 
The results for analysis of subjects' global ratings of their 
memories therefore do not support corollary A of Hypothesis 
III, which predicted that recalled memories would be congruent 
with the contextual mood used to frame them. 
To test corollary B of Hypothesis III, the independent 
scales of positivity and negativity of the memories were used 
as measurements of the dependent variable. Each scale ranged 
from 1 to 7, with a higher score on the positivity scale 
meaning a more positive affective quality of the memory, and 
a higher score on the negativity scale meaning a more negative 
affective quality. These ratings, as shown in Table 3, were 
given for each of the three memories recalled by subjects on 
the High School Memory task. 
Subject ratings of each memory on each scale (happiness 
and sadness) were entered into a repeated-measures MANOVA with 
one between-subjects variable, mood condition (happy, sad, 
neutral) and two within-subjects variables: order in which the 
memory was recalled (first, second, or third memory recalled 
by each subject), and rating scale (positivity or negativity). 
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Note: Higher score indicate more positive memories; lower scores Indicate more negative memories. 
Figure 2. Subjects' Memory Ratings: Overall 
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According to corollary B of Hypothesis III, the separate 
ratings of positivity and negativity should obscure any 
underlying mood congruency of memory and mood, so a 
significant interaction between mood condition and rating 
scale should not be apparent. In addition, no effects of 
memory number were expected, either in interaction with the 
TABLE 3 
SUBJECT MEMORY RATINGS: 
POSITIVITY AND NEGATIVITY 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
POSITIVITY NEGATIVITY 
Memory Memory 
MOOD 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Happy 5.63 5.17 5.24 2.03 2.69 2.21 
(1.70) (2.24) ( 1. 92) ( 1. 59) (2.16) ( 1. 63) 
Sad 4.87 4.63 3.70 2.80 3.17 4.27 
(1.96) (2.37) (2.63) (2.11) (2.51) (2.53) 
Neutral 5.07 5.07 4.93 2.97 2.93 2.03 
(2.23) (2.24) (2.26) (2.17) (2.93) (3.03) 
other variables or as a main effect. 
This analysis showed the predicted lack of main effects 
or interactions involving memory number. However, an 
unpredicted significant interaction was found between mood 
condition and rating scale, l. ( 2, 8 6) =3. 64, !2_<. 05. To interpret 
this interaction, the main effects of mood condition were 
examined for each type of rating scale. A significant 
difference between mood conditions was found on the negativity 
Negativity 
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Figure 3. Subjects' Memory Ratings: Negativity 0) 0 
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significance for these group differences was shown on the 
positivity scale, f(2,86)=2.99, 2<.07 (see Figure 4). 
Follow-up t-tests indicated that subjects in the happy 
mood condition rated their memories significantly higher on 
the positivity scale {M=5.34) than did subjects in the sad 
mood condition (M=4.4; t(57)=2.30, 2<.05). similarly, 
subjects in the higher mood condition rated their memories 
significantly lower on the negativity scale {M=2.39) than did 
subjects in the sad mood condition (M=3. 41; t ( 58) =-2. 58, 
2<. 05). No differences in memory ratings on either scale were 
found between the happy and neutral groups or between the sad 
and neutral groups. 
The results of the analyses on subjects• negativity and 
positivity memory ratings do not support corollary B of 
Hypothesis III, which predicted that mood congruency should 
not be observed when positivity and negativity were rated 
separately. Instead, mood congruency was observed using the 
isolated ratings. While differences between the MMIP groups 
and the neutral group were not observed, there was a 
consistent difference in the ratings of memories for each MMIP 
group, with subjects in the happy condition recalling less 
negative and more positive memories than subjects in the sad 
condition. This contrasts with the findings for subjects' 
global ratings of positivity/negativity of memories, 
suggesting that the type of scoring method used to code 
narrated events has had an influence on results. Further 
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Figure 4. Subjects' Memory Ratings: Positivity 
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implications of the differences of these findings will be 
addressed in the Discussion section. 
Judges' Ratings 
Parallel to the two forms of scoring for subject ratings 
of the memories, independent judges also used the two methods: 
a single, overall or global scale, and two independent scales. 
To test corollary C of Hypothesis III, scores on the global 
measure of positivity/negativity were examined as the 
dependent variable, using the ratings of two judges who used 
an oppositional rating method, adapted from Parrott and Sabini 
(1990) (see Table 4). The scale ranged from 1 to 7, with a 
score below the midpoint of 4 indicating a generally more 
negative than positive memory, and a score greater than 4 
indicating a generally more positive than negative memory). 
In rating the memories, the judges obtained reliabilities 
ranging from r=.93 to r=.95, with an average reliability of 
r=.94. 
The means of judges' ratings were entered into a MANOVA 
with one between-subject variable (happy, sad, neutral mood 
condition) and one within-subject variable (first, second or 
third memory). If corollary c of Hypothesis III is correct, 
the judges' extraspective, "third person" status should 
obscure any observance of mood congruity of memories. 
As predicted, the results showed no effects for the 
interaction between mood condition and memory number, 
Hotelling's ~2=.052, ~(4, 170)=1.11, 2>.35, nor for mood 
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TABLE 4 
JUDGES' MEMORY RATINGS: 
OVERALL AFFECT 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
POSITIVITY 
Memory 
MOOD 
CONDITIONS 1 2 3 
Happy 5.03 4.43 4.88 
(1.23) (1.46) (1.56) 
Sad 4.70 4.40 3.85 
( 1. 83) ( 1. 83) (2.50) 
Neutral 4.52 3.95 4.50 
(1. 78) ( 1. 77) (2.81) 
condition, ~(2,87)=1.35, R>.26. However, there was a trend 
toward significance for the effect of memory number on judges' 
global ratings, Hotelling's '.r.2=.056, ~(2,86)=2.44, R<.095. 
Univariate t-tests revealed that the first memory was rated as 
significantly more towards the positive end of the scale than 
was the second memory, t(89)=2.23, R<.05. There were no 
significant differences between the first and third memory, 
t(89)=1.34, R>.18, nor between the second and third memory, 
t(89)=-.63, R>.52 (see Figure 5). The results for 
judges'overall, global ratings of the affective content of 
memories therefore lend support to corollary C of Hypothesis 
III, in that mood congruity was not observed in judges' 
ratings of these memories. 
The final method used for testing Hypothesis III was to 
use judges' ratings of memories on the two separate scales of 
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positivity and negativity. To test corollary D of Hypothesis 
III, the independent scores of positivity and negativity of 
the memory were examined as the dependent variable, using the 
ratings of two judges trained in the scoring method used by 
Parrott and Sabini (1990) (see Table 5). Each scale ranged 
from 1 to 7, with a higher score on the positivity scale 
meaning a more positive affective quality, and a higher score 
on the negativity scale meaning a more negative affective 
quality. Reliability of scoring for these judges on the three 
memories ranged from r=.77 to r=.89, with the average 
reliability being r=.84. 
TABLE 5 
JUDGES' MEMORY RATINGS: 
POSITIVITY AND NEGATIVITY, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
POSITIVITY NEGATIVITY 
Memory Memory 
MOOD 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Happy 4.57 4.02 4.54 2.54 2.96 2.70 
( 1. 79) (1.92) (1.76) (1.60) (1.87) ( 2. 11) 
Sad 4.02 3.94 3.77 3.07 3.04 3.90 
(1.96) ( 2. 09) (2.34) ( 1. 94) ( 1. 99) (2.37) 
Neutral 4.52 3.46 4.58 2.92 3.44 3.42 
(2.12) ( 2. 14) (2.34) (2.20) ( 2. 12) (2.43) 
Judges' ratings of each memory on each scale were entered 
into a repeated-measures MANOVA with one between-subjects 
variable, mood condition (happy, sad, neutral) and two within-
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subjects variables: order in which the memory was recalled 
(first, second, or third memory recalled by each subject), and 
rating scale (positivity or negativity). According to 
corollary D of Hypothesis III, the judges' extraspective, 
"third person" status and the use of separate ratings of 
positivity and negativity should combine to obscure the 
observations of mood congruency; a significant interaction 
between mood condition and rating scale should not be 
apparent. In addition, no main or interaction effects of 
memory number were expected. 
The results of this analysis showed no interaction 
between mood condition and rating scale, E(2,76)=0.96, R>.39. 
However, a significant main effect of memory number was 
apparent, Hotelling's ~2=.31, E(2,75)=11.81, R<.001. 
Pairwise t-tests between each memory position revealed that 
the first memory was rated by judges as higher on the positive 
scale (M=4.39) than the second memory (M=3.78; t(79)=2.38, 
R<.05). There was also a trend towards significance for the 
difference in positivity ratings seen when the second memory 
(M=3.81) was compared to the third memory (M=4.29, t(78)= 
-1.79, R<.08) with third memories tending to be more positive 
(see Figures 6 and 7). 
The results for judges' ratings of the positivity 
and negativity of memories demonstrate support for corollary 
D of Hypothesis III, which predicted that mood congruency 
would not be demonstrated in judges' ratings. As in the 
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results for overall, global ratings of positivity/negativity, 
a pattern is seen in which the positivity of memories is 
related to the order in which it is recalled. This pattern 
suggests that according to external judges, subjects' first 
memory tends to be more positive across mood conditions, with 
few differences between the other memories. This was true for 
both overall and separate positivity/negativity ratings. 
Implications of these findings are taken up in the Discussion 
section. 
Part II. 
Manipulation Check 
As in Part I, Hypothesis I was first tested in order to 
provide evidence that the experimental manipulation was 
effective. To find out whether happy and sad music provided 
a context used by subjects in evaluating their moods during 
the second session, the dependent variable was subjects' mood 
as measured by the two scales, happiness and sadness, as 
derived from two mood assessment measures in Part 2 (MA4 and 
MAS, see Table 6} . Recall that a higher score on the 
happiness scale, which ranged from 1 to 7, indicated a happier 
mood for the subject, while a higher score on the sadness 
scale, which also ranged from 1 to 7, indicated a sadder mood. 
The scale scores for happiness and sadness at each time 
of measurement were entered into a repeated measures MANOVA. 
The design had one between-subjects variable, mood condition 
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TABLE 6 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) OF MOOD SCALES, 
PART II 
MOOD SCALES 
MOOD 
CONDITIONS Happiness Sadness 
Happy Before MMIP 4.12 ( 1. 18) 1.70 (0.86) 
After MMIP 4.43 ( 1.14) 1. 58 (0.75) 
Sad Before MMIP 4.52 {1.29) 1. 78 (1.25) 
After MMIP 1. 78 (1.25) 2.30 ( 1. 39) 
Neutral Before MMIP 3.93 (1.17) 2.18 (1.20) 
After MMIP 3.93 (1.17) 2.18 (1.20) 
Note. Higher scores indicate a happier mood on the happiness 
scale, whereas higher scores indicate a sadder mood on the 
sadness measure. 
(happy music, sad music, or no music) and two within-subjects 
variables: time of measurement (before and after the MMIP) and 
mood scale (happiness scale and sadness scale) . Subjects who 
did not hear music only rated mood once (MA4) before the 
memory task. For these subjects, both the "before MMIP" and 
"after MMIP" mood ratings were considered in the following 
analyses to be identical to this single rating. According to 
Hypothesis I, a three-way interaction should occur, indicating 
that changes in mood ratings at different times of measurement 
should vary relative to the mood condition and relative to the 
mood scale. 
As predicted, the three-way interaction of mood 
condition, mood scale, and time of measurement was 
significant, ~(2,86)=21.0l, R<.001. An analysis of the simple 
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interaction of mood condition and time of measurement, when 
the type of mood scale was held constant, was significant for 
ratings of happiness, f(2,86)=30.74, R<.001, and for ratings 
of sadness, f(2,86)=8.19, R<.01. 
In order to test corollaries A and B of Hypothesis I, 
which predicted that the MMIP itself was effective in 
manipulating subjects' mood, the next step was to analyze the 
simple simple main effect of the time of measurement variable, 
when mood condition was held constant. For subjects in the 
sad mood condition, ratings of happiness after the sad music 
(M=3.72) were significantly lower than they had been at the 
beginning of the experiment (M=4.52; f(l,29)=28.60, R<.001), 
while ratings of sadness after the MMIP (M=2.30) were 
significantly higher than before the music (M=l. 78; 
f(l,29)=7.54, R<.05). For subjects in the happy mood 
condition, ratings of happiness after the happy music (M=4.43) 
were significantly higher than they had been at the beginning 
of the experiment (M=4.11; f(l,28)=10.08, R<.01). In this 
group, however, ratings of sadness after the MMIP (M=l.57) 
were not significantly lower than before the happy music 
(M=l.70; f(l.29)=.22, R>.64). 
As in Part I, the results of this analysis support 
corollaries A and B of Hypothesis I that music will be a 
context taken into account as subjects assess their mood: 
Subjects who heard happy music became more happy, while 
subjects who heard sad music became both less happy and more 
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sad. Also similar to Part I results, it seemed that the sad 
music appeared to be a context which was more effective for 
changing subjects' mood. 
To address corollaries c and D of Hypothesis I, which 
predicted that subjects of different groups will differ in 
mood depending on the mood condition assigned, a second 
examination of the simple interaction between mood condition 
and time of measurement was undertaken. An analysis of the 
simple simple effect of mood condition at each time of 
measurement revealed that before the MMIP, subjects in 
different mood conditions were not significantly different 
on either happiness, ~(2,87)=1.82, 2>.17; or sadness, 
~ ( 2 , 8 7) = 1. 2 9 , 2> . 2 8 However, after the respective MMIPs, 
there was a trend toward significance for the difference 
between groups on the happiness scale, ~(2,87)=2.79, 2<.08; 
and a significant difference between groups on the sadness 
scale, ~(2,86)=3.38, 2<.05. 
Follow-up t-tests showed that subjects who had heard 
happy music rated happiness significantly higher (M=4.43) than 
subjects hearing sad music (M=3.72; t(57)=2.31, 2<.05). 
Similarly, in the happy MMIP condition, sadness was rated 
significantly lower (M=l.58) than in the sad MMIP condition 
(M=2.30; t(57)=-2.49, 2<.05). Comparisons between the happy 
and neutral mood conditions and between the sad and neutral 
mood conditions revealed no significant differences on either 
the happiness or sadness scales. 
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These results are interpreted as showing that subjects 
who heard music in Part II of the experiment not only changed 
their moods in a direction consistent with the musical 
context, but that this change also resulted in significant 
differences between groups, depending on the type of music 
heard. Thus corollaries C and D of Hypothesis I are 
supported: Subjects who hearing happy music were observably 
more happy and less sad than subjects hearing sad music, who 
assessed their mood as more sad and less happy. Inspection of 
these means also shows that after the happy music, subjects 
rated themselves above the midpoint of 4 on the happiness 
rating scale, and below the midpoint of 4 on the sadness 
scale. In contrast, after the sad MMIP, subjects in the sad 
mood condition rated happiness below that scale's midpoint of 
4, although their ratings on the sadness scale were also below 
the midpoint of 4. In sum, Hypothesis I is seen as being 
supported in Part II in its prediction that subjects use 
affectively-toned music as a context for assessing their mood. 
Mood and Learning 
Hypothesis IV, which predicted that people will better 
learn those items that are affectively congruent with their 
current mood state, was tested by using as dependent variables 
two learning measures independently calculated from 
performance scores: "percent hits" and "trials to criterion" 
(see Table 7) . Percent hi ts is defined as the number of 
correct trials over the number of trials presented in learning 
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a list of trigrams. This variable could theoretically range 
from 0% to 100%, with a higher score indicating more accurate 
performance on the task. In this study, percent hits ranged 
from 15% to 86% Trials to criterion is defined as the number 
of trials necessary for the subject to reach the criterion for 
learning a list of trigrams, that criterion being correctly 
naming all trigram pairs consecutively, twice in a row. This 
variable ranged in this sample from 8 to 55, with a lower 
score indicating faster learning of the item. 
TABLE 7 
TRIGRAM LEARNING: 
PERCENT HITS AND TRIALS TO CRITERION, 
LIKED AND DISLIKED TRIGRAMS, 
MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) 
PERCENT HITS TRIALS TO CRITERION 
MOOD Liked Disliked Liked Disliked 
CONDITIONS Trigrams Trigrams Trigrams Trigrams 
Happy 57.20 53.00 58.03 63.87 
(10.51) (11.15} (23.29) (26.10) 
Sad 56.57 50.23 59.00 59.37 
(11.00) (12.88} (24.79) (25.95) 
Neutral 57.50 55.13 68.73 75.50 
(11.98) ( 9.84} (33.00) (37.56) 
The design of the MANOVA used on these dependent 
variables consisted of one between-subjects variable (happy, 
sad, or neutral mood condition) and one within-subjects 
variable (liked and disliked item type}. Hypothesis IV 
predicted an interaction between mood condition and item type, 
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with people in a neutral or happy mood learning liked items 
better, while people in a sad mood learn disliked trigrams 
better, as measured by both learning variables. 
Contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis IV, no 
interaction was observed between mood condition and liked 
versus disliked items, Hotelling's .'I'.2=.077, E.(4,170)=1.64, 
R>.17. However, a main effect on learning was observed for 
item type, Hotelling's .'I'.2=.076, E.(2,86)=3.28, R<.05; while no 
effect was observed for mood alone, 
E.(4,170), R>.11. This pattern was 
Hotelling's .'I'.2=.090, 
further observed in 
univariate tests for percent hits, which showed a main effect 
for item type, E.(1,87)=6.62, R<.05; but no effects for the 
interaction, E.(2,87)=.47, R>.63; or for mood, E.(2,87)=1.0l, 
R>.36 (see Figure 8). Similarly, univariate tests of trials 
to criterion showed a trend towards significance for item 
type, E_(l,87)=2.81, R<.10, with no observed interaction 
effects, E.(2,97)=.60, R>.55, and no main effects of mood, 
E.(2,87)=2.15, R>.12 (see Figure 9). 
Follow-up comparisons between the means for liked versus 
disliked items showed that subjects had a higher percent hit 
rate for liked trigrams (M=57.1) than for disliked trigrams 
(M=52.8), indicating more accurate learning of liked items 
over disliked items. In the same pattern, subjects achieved 
the learning criterion in fewer trials for liked trigrams 
(M=61.9) than for disliked trigrams (M=66.3), indicating 
faster learning of liked items over disliked items. Thus, 
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Hypothesis III was not supported by these results, with the 
data being interpreted instead as pointing towards an overall 
faster and more accurate learning of liked over disliked 
trigrams, regardless of mood condition during learning. 
Percent Hits 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
Manipulation Checks 
Support was moderate for Hypothesis I, which predicted 
that positively and negatively toned music would serve as a 
context which people use when evaluating their mood. In 
testing corollaries A and B of Hypothesis I, the sad MMIP 
appeared to be a more powerful framework for subjects' framing 
of their own mood. Subjects in this condition changed in 
their self-ratings of mood by becoming both sadder and less 
happy, while subjects in the happy mood condition showed a 
trend toward becoming more happy but did not become less sad. 
These results may indicate that if a person is already in a 
good mood, she may be less prone to employ an external context 
as a framework for enhancing how she is already feeling. When 
a different context (such as sad music) is presented, the 
subject may use this oppositional quality of the environment 
in predicating her mood. 
As predicted in corollaries C and D of the hypothesis, a 
significant difference was observed in Part I between sad and 
happy mood conditions, with subjects who heard happy music 
rating their moods as happier and less sad than subjects who 
heard sad music. In addition, subjects in the sad condition 
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rated themselves as sadder than subjects who did not hear 
music, while there was a trend for happy MMIP subjects to make 
higher ratings of happiness compared to neutral subjects. 
Similar results were found when Hypothesis I was tested 
for Part II of the experiment. A difference was observed in 
subjects' mood not only between groups, but also across time 
of measurement. Just as in Part I, corrolaries A and B were 
partially supported in that subjects who heard sad music also 
decreased their ratings of happiness and increased ratings of 
sadness, while happy subjects increased only their ratings of 
happiness. Thus, while the effects of the sad MMIP appeared on 
both happiness and sadness scales and the happy MMIP only 
changed scores on the happiness scale, both MMIPs appeared to 
be contexts used by subjects to some degree in framing their 
moods. 
Corollaries C and D were also supported in that subjects 
in the happy mood condition rated their moods as happier and 
less sad than sad subjects. However, no differences were 
observed between the neutral (no music) group and the MMIP 
groups. This finding and the limited group differences 
between neutral and MMIP conditions in Part I may be evidence 
for a finite magnitude of the effects of music in changing 
mood from a moderate, neutral state to an extreme of happiness 
or sadness. In other words, the subjects in the MMIP groups 
may have changed their moods enough to be noticeably different 
from each other in a between-subjects comparison, and from 
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their own starting moods on a within-subjects comparison. Yet 
this change may not have been as large, or apparent at all, on 
a less powerful between-subjects comparison with neutral 
subjects. 
Hypothesis II examined Parrott and Sabini's (1990) 
proposed explanation of mood incongruent recall suggesting 
that the phenomenon involved a process of mood repair. Based 
on LLT, it was not expected that the memories would "produce" 
a different mood, but that the mood would organize the 
memories. Therefore no differences were expected in mood as 
an efficient cause result of recalling positive or negative 
memories. This hypothesis was supported in that no 
differences were evident between mood before and after the 
memory task. It could be argued that a change in mood would 
only be seen if the memories were indeed incongruent with mood 
(see below for discussion of mood congruency results). 
However, if memories are considered a force which could push 
mood down or up like mercury in a thermometer, positive 
memories should further increase a happy mood, while negative 
memories should push mood further in a sad direction. Such a 
mood enhancement effect was not demonstrated. Support for 
Hypothesis II should not be interpreted to mean that 
recollection of events never influences mood; it is however, 
more consistent with these data to conceptualize organizing 
predications as the formal cause of the memory retrieval, 
rather than the memories as an efficient cause of mood. 
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Mood and Memory 
The procedure in Part I was effective in leading to a 
difference in moods between the groups of subjects, so that 
Hypothesis III could be examined. This hypothesis predicted 
that people would recall events that are congruent in 
affective value with their current mood state, but only when 
idiographic, oppositional ratings of the posi ti vi ty /negativity 
dimension were employed. Support for this hypothesis was 
mixed. Contrary to corollary A of Hypothesis III, no effects 
of mood group were observed when subjects used the overall, 
oppositional measure of positivity and negativity to rate 
memories. In contrast, a significant mood-congruency effect 
was observed when the memories were rated by subjects on 
independent scales of positivity and negativity, which 
contradicted corrollary B. 
Two possible explanations come to mind. The first is 
that, rather than obscuring the oppositional nature of 
positivity and negativity, the scales in which these were each 
addressed separately may have highlighted their opposition-
ality. Paying attention to the separated positive and 
negative affect experienced in each memory may have led 
subjects to acknowledge significant details that were either 
ignored in the global measure or "swamped" by the overriding 
affect of the memory. 
Another possibility is that subjects actually viewed 
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their memories differently when they used a scale that 
incorporates oppositionality in its structure, as in the 
overall scale. While subtleties in affective judgment may be 
significantly different when positive and negative aspects are 
isolated, these differences may be less salient when the 
overall affect of the memory is considered. 
While the oppositional nature of the positivity/ 
negativity dimension played out differently than expected in 
Hypothesis III, the demonstration of mood congruency in 
subjects' idiographic ratings is quite consistent with LLT's 
conceptualization of predication as a process by which meaning 
is extended from a category or framework to a target. In this 
case, a task is presented to subjects, "recall several 
experiences from your high-school years," and beyond this, 
subjects must use their own strategies for selecting which of 
these memories to report. The happy or sad mood is seen by 
LLT as the framework used for this selection: for example, the 
organizing principle of a positive predication extends meaning 
more readily to memories that themselves are positive, in a 
sense bringing those memories to light by virtue of their 
assessed qualities. In contrast, a negative mood/predication 
is a category in which a memory's negative affect, as assessed 
by the subject, is more consistent. 
On the other hand, the use of independent judges to rate 
memories failed to capture any significant differences for 
memories of subjects in happy, sad, or neutral groups, whether 
two single scales or one overall scale was employed. 
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This 
lack of mood congruency, which is consistent with corollaries 
C and D of Hypothesis III, can be interpreted in two ways. It 
may be that mood is not a context which subjects use as a 
predicating framework for recalling memories; other factors 
may be more important in the process of remembering 
experienced material. However, this conclusion would be in 
conflict with some of the supporting results for subjects' 
memory ratings. 
The other explanation originally suggested by LLT is that 
the affective quality of a recalled experience is better 
judged by the experiencing subject herself than by an external 
observer. Independent judges who rate a memory as an isolated 
object may miss the personal relevance of an experience that 
a subject can take into account in rating the 
positivity/negativity of the memory, while failing to convey 
this information to a reader. The difference in findings 
depending on who decides what is positive and negative affect 
emphasizes that the idiographic approach advocated by LLT can 
identify processes that otherwise go unnoticed. 
An unexpected effect was observed in memory ratings of 
judges in that differences were found in the ratings of the 
memory depending on the order in which it was recalled. These 
differences were significant when one pair of judges made 
independent ratings of positivity and negativity, while there 
was a trend towards significance when another pair of judges 
used a global measure of positivity/negativity. 
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Further 
examination revealed that the main source of the order effect 
was, in both cases, a tendency for the first memory recalled 
to be more positively rated than the second in all groups. 
While this effect is not addressed by any of this thesis' 
hypotheses, LLT could explain the observation as the result of 
a naturally positive predication that subjects make when 
approaching any new task or target. This would enhance the 
effects of a predication based on positive mood, and might 
counter the negative extension of meaning that comes from a 
sad mood or predication. Thus, in recalling memories, 
subjects may, at least initially, continue to use a positive 
background framework that is even more basic than that which 
they take on in their affective mood state. 
Mood and Learning 
Part II of the thesis addressed Hypothesis IV, which 
predicted that people would better learn those items that are 
affectively congruent (as individually assessed) with their 
current mood state. This hypothesis was not supported by the 
results, which showed no interaction between mood condition 
and item type to predict learning. Instead, subjects in all 
three groups tended to learned liked trigrams more accurately 
and more quickly than disliked trigrams. Such a "positive 
affective assessment effect" has been found in many other LLT 
studies of learning and is therefore consistent with research 
on learning in normal people with positive views of themselves 
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and the task they perform. Yet, the hypothesis was based on 
the prediction that positive or negative predication of 
context will facilitate learning of items that have been 
affectively 
framework. 
Several 
assessed as congruent with that background 
Why was this effect not observed? 
explanations can be considered. 
interpretation most oppositional to LLT would be 
The 
that 
predication was not operating during the task, rather; other 
influences such as familiarity took effect. For example, 
liked trigrams may have been more recognizable or more 
wordlike by most subjects and therefore more easily learned. 
However, this explanation fails to take into the account the 
research discussed in the above review of LLT, in which better 
learning of positively affectively assessed material has been 
shown to be independent of such factors as the number of 
associations to or wordlikeness of the items. The 
explanations of these results should be considered in light of 
previous research as well. 
There is also the possibility that positive or negative 
mood as a context/predication was not applied by subjects to 
the targeted items to be learned. While Hypothesis IV 
presumed subjects would use mood as a relevant framework for 
organizing the learning process, subjects may have felt their 
participation in the learning task to be more unrelated to 
their current mood. The procedure itself, particularly the 
the playing of happy or sad music throughout the learning 
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task, may have added to this separation between predications 
relevant to mood and those related to learning. Music was 
intended to provide a consistent context in which mood would 
be evaluated. In contrast, the MMIPs may have also been 
distracting enough that, in order to complete the challenging 
learning task, subjects found it helpful to ignore the music 
purposively, at the same time ignoring the affective 
evaluation and mood that they experienced in that musical 
context. 
For example, a subject in a negative mood may think to 
herself, "I really hate this music, or I feel really rotten, 
but I have to ignore that stuff and get down to business here 
and get these trigrams into my head." Whether or not this 
attitude is conscious, if such a concentration on learning and 
lack of attention to music and mood occurred, mood may not 
have been a context or organization used in predicating the 
items to be learned. This interpretation is consistent with 
research which shows that merely asking subjects to take on a 
given predication does not guarantee that they will actually 
do so (Rychlak, 1974). In this case, suggesting a mood (via 
music) may not have brought subjects to employ that particular 
predication in the learning task. 
A final explanation is suggested by the consistency of 
these results with other LLT research on learning in normal 
subjects, in which positive items were learned more easily 
when subjects had generally positive predications of 
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themselves and their environment. It may be that most 
subjects in this experiment did indeed have more positive than 
negative predications of the situation they were in, thus 
leading to better learning of positive trigrams. This would 
suggest that even though there were differences in happiness 
and sadness between the assigned mood conditions, the actual 
mood of the subjects that was used to frame learning may have 
been generally positive. In fact, this "after the fact" 
explanation is supported by an examination of the means on 
mood measures for Part II, especially for subjects in the sad 
mood condition. Even though the sad MMIP was effective in 
decreasing happiness and increasing sadness of these subjects, 
the average final mood state was more happy than sad. In 
addition, even though these subjects were less happy and more 
sad than happy subjects, the generally positive affective 
assessment of mood may have been the basis for a positive 
predication of the task. In other words, most subjects, 
despite their assigned group, may have had positive 
predications going into the task, which facilitated the 
learning of positively assessed items. 
The latter explanation leads to possibilities for further 
LLT-based research in the area of mood and learning. The 
results of this study support the use of affectively-toned 
music as a context which subjects can use as an organizing 
principle for evaluating mood. However, the individual 
subject may evaluate this context in varying degrees of 
positive or negative affect. 
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Future studies may assign 
subjects to mood conditions after the intervention, based on 
individuals' actual mood ratings, rather than randomly 
assigning subjects to experimental conditions and obtaining 
mean mood ratings for each group as a whole. Thus, 
researchers could examine the learning of subjects who are 
actually happy or sad to see what, if any, effects these 
predications have on the process. 
Conclusions 
The results and interpretations of this thesis address 
several issues in the mood and memory field. First of all, 
the results of Part I of the experiment do not cross-validate 
Parrott and Sabini's (1990) findings of mood-incongruent 
recall. In fact, the results indicate a mood congruency 
phenomenon, which occur only when subjects, not independent 
judges, evaluated their memories. The exclusive use of non-
participant judges of affective quality may be problematic, in 
that signficant differences in individuals' memories may be 
missed, or possibly attributed where none exist in the 
experience of the subjects themselves. The use of external 
judges in experimental studies may be common, but the third-
person perspective of "the other" may add an aspect of 
artificiality to data which may explain the inconsistency of 
mood-incongruency findings in Parrott and Sabini's work 
(1990). As stressed by LLT, inclusion of an idiographic or 
introspective, personal assessment of events by subjects seems 
111 
to be an important, perhaps neccesary, element of the design 
of such studies. 
The phenomenon of mood congruent recall has been observed 
in many studies which have used Bower' s ( 19 81) NNTA as an 
explanatory theory. Indeed, NNTA would predict mood congruent 
recall of memories in the procedure used in this thesis, in 
that activation of happy or sad nodes would spread to 
activation of events associatively linked to those nodes. 
However, as pointed out in the review of research on NNTA, 
there has been a failure to demonstrate consistently the 
effectiveness of mood as an associative "trigger" for recall 
of linked items, as in the phenomenon of mood-dependent 
recall. This has cast doubt on the explanatory power of a 
purely material/efficient cause theory in addressing the 
complex nature of human memory. 
The first part of this thesis demonstrates that Logical 
Learning Theory, whose formal/final cause emphasis is 
fundamentally different from the nodal network theory of 
affect, can also effectively account for the observations of 
mood congruent recall by focusing on the evaluative, 
predicating aspects of cognition. In addition, the second 
part of the thesis begins to explore how mood can be viewed 
from an LLT standpoint as a formal cause pattern which 
predicates actual learning itself, a process perhaps more 
basic than recall of learned or remembered material. As the 
formal and final cause emphasis of LLT begin to contribute to 
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the understanding of mood congruent recall, further research 
using LLTs predictions to examine this phenomenon, as well as 
the concept of mood-dependent recall, could continue to be 
productive. Other topics in the field of mood and memory may 
also benefit from the alternative hypotheses and explanations 
offered by Logical Learning Theory's introspective, 
teleological view of affect. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Music Selections 
"Happy" Program (all played at full speed) 
*1. That Da-Da Strain (2:15) 
*2. That's A Plenty (3:14) 
*3. W & L Swing (3:49) 
*4. Limehouse Blues (2:48) 
*5. Original Dixieland One Step (2:52) 
6. Prelude and La Garde Montante from Bizet's Carmen (5:02) 
7. Dvorak's Slavonik Dances, Numbers 1, 5, and 6 (18:05) 
8. Selections from "The Entertainer: 11 The Glove, Little Girl, 
Pineapple Rag, The Entertainer, Easy Winners (11:35) 
9. Claude Bolling's Suite for Flute and Jazz Piano (excerpts; 
12:55) 
"Sad" Program 
*1. Shostakovich's 15th Symphony, 2nd Movement (excerpt, 
played at 2/3 speed; 5:27) 
*2. "Russia Under the Mongolian Yoke" from Prokofiev's 
Alexander Nevsky (played at 1/2 speed; 5:38) 
*3. Tchaikovsky's 6th Symphony, 4th movement (ending, played 
at 2/3 speed; 3:56) 
4. Mahler's 5th Symphony, 4th movement (11:33) 
5. Tchaikovsky's 6th Symphony, 4th movement (beginning; 
10:00) 
6. Beethoven's Egmont Overture (excerpt; 2:24) 
7. Prokofiev's Romeo and Juliet (excerpt; 3:35) 
8. Wagner's Prelude and Liebestod (12:15) 
*Starred selections provided by W.G. Parrott via personal 
correspondence, February 6, 1991. 
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APPENDIX B 
Mood Assessment (MA) 
1. At this moment, how cheerful do you feel? 
not at all moderately very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. At this moment, how anxious do you feel? 
not at all moderately very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. At this moment, how sad do you feel? 
not at all moderately very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. At this moment, how confused do you feel? 
not at all moderately very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. At this moment, how depressed do you feel? 
not at all moderately very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. At this moment, how apprehensive do you feel? 
not at all moderately very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. At this moment, how happy do you feel? 
not at all moderately very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. At this moment, how uncertain do you feel? 
not at all moderately very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. At this moment, how hopeless do you feel? 
not at all moderately very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. At this moment, how fearful do you feel? 
not at all moderately very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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11. At this moment, 
not at all 
1 2 
Scale Items for Mood 
Happy: 1,7,11 
Sad: 3,5,9 
how lighthearted do you 
moderately 
3 4 5 
Assessment 
Anxious: 2,6,10 
Uncertain: 4,8 
feel? 
6 
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very 
7 
APPENDIX C 
High School Memory Task CHSM) 
At this time, try to remember three specific events that 
happened to you during your high school years. Write down a 
brief description of the first three memories that come to 
your mind, in the order they occur to you. After each memory 
write how you felt about the event at the time. Your 
responses will be kept strictly confidential. 
1. Event: 
How did you feel about this event? 
2. Event: 
How did you feel about this event? 
3. Event: 
How did you feel about this event? 
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APPENDIX D 
Subject Rating Scale: Positive 
HSI-P 
on a scale of 1 to 7, please rate each memory according to how 
positive it was for you. 
Event 1. 
not at all 
positive 
1 2 
Event 2. 
not at all 
positive 
1 2 
Event 3. 
not at all 
positive 
1 2 
3 
3 
3 
moderately 
positive 
4 
moderately 
positive 
4 
moderately 
positive 
4 
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5 
5 
5 
very 
positive 
6 7 
very 
positive 
6 7 
very 
positive 
6 7 
APPENDIX E 
Subject Rating Scale: Negative 
HSI-N 
On a scale of 1 to 7, please rate each memory according to how 
negative it was for you. 
Event 1. 
not at all 
negative 
1 2 
Event 2. 
not at all 
negative 
1 2 
Event 3. 
not at all 
negative 
1 2 
3 
3 
3 
moderately 
negative 
4 
moderately 
negative 
4 
moderately 
negative 
4 
122 
5 
5 
5 
very 
negative 
6 7 
very 
negative 
6 7 
very 
negative 
6 7 
APPENDIX F 
Subject Rating Scale: General 
HSI-G 
On a scale of 1 to 7, please rate each memory according to how 
negative or positive it was for you as a whole. 
Event 1. 
very 
negative 
1 
Event 2. 
very 
negative 
1 
Event 3. 
very 
negative 
1 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
123 
6 
6 
6 
very 
positive 
7 
very 
positive 
7 
very 
positive 
7 
APPENDIX G 
Phonetic Preference Inventory (PPI) 
Age: Sex: 
This is a test of letter-combination preference. It 
consists of 140 syllable-like "trigrams" composed of differing 
letter combinations. Your are to look at each one of the 
trigrams and then place an "X" to indicate whether you like or 
dislike the trigram. Read it "aloud" to yourself and then 
decide on the basis of how you "feel" about it. 
There are no right or wrong answers in the usual sense, 
because all answers are equally good. While there is no time 
limit on this test, you should not linger over any of the 
trigrams nor try to analyze why you like or dislike them. 
Just look at each trigram and place an "X" in the appropriate 
space below to indicate whether you: 
(LM) like the trigram much 
(LS) like the trigram slightly 
(DS) dislike the trigram slightly 
(DM) dislike the trigram much 
Remember, no matter how slight your feeling may be, every 
trigram must be marked to indicate whether you like or dislike 
it. 
Syllable (LM) (LS) (DS) (DM) Syllable (LM) (LS) (DS} (DM) 
1. JOR ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11. FAP ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
2. RAJ ( ( ( ( 12. HIB ( ) ( ) ( ( 
3. WYR ( ( ( ( 13. BEH ( ( ) ( ( 
4. YIR ( ( ( 14. DEH ( ( ( ( 
5. YOC ( ( ( ( 15. DYX ( ( ( ( 
6. RYF ( ( ( ( 16. GOZ ( ( ( 
7. RYK ( ( ( 17. JOX ( ( ( ( 
8. SEQ ( ) ( ( 18. MOY ( ( ) ( ( 
9. NUJ ( ( ( 19. PEM ( ( ( ( 
10. PIV ( ( ( ( 20. QIC ( ( ( ) ( 
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Syllable (LM) (LS) (DS) (DM) Syllable (LM) (LS) (DS) (DM) 
21 . WOB ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 4 4 . KOS ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
22. WYM ( 
23. YUH 
24. CYK ( 
25. DYS ( 
26. HUZ ( 
27. KEV ( 
28. LIG ( 
29. LIX ( 
30. NEP ( 
31. TYD ( 
32. vox ( 
33. YAT ( 
34. BYK ( 
35. GUC ( 
36. RYN ( 
37. sov ( 
38. WEV ( 
39. YEZ ( 
40. LUT ( 
41. NUP ( 
42. PID ( 
43. GAW ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
) ( ) ( 
( ( ) ( 
( ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
) ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( ) ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( ( 
( ) ( 
( 
45. KUN ( 
46. CAG 
47. FIL ( 
48. FYX ( 
49. FAZ ( 
50. HOZ ( 
( ) ( 
( ( 
( 
( 
( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ( ) 
( 
( 
( 
( 
51. JUM ( ) ( ) ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 52. MUV ( ( ( 
53. NAS ( 
54. PIQ ( 
( 
( 
( ( 
( ) ( 
55. SYK ( ( ) ( ( 
( 
( 
56. WYT ( 
57. ZEL 
58. HYT ( 
( 
( 
( 
59. JOD ( ) ( 
60. TUS ( 
61. WUD 
62. JAV ( 
63. LYM ( 
64. PEB ( 
65. PYC ( 
66. WEG ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( ) ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( ) ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( ) ( 
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Syllable (LM) (LS) (OS) (OM) Syllable (LM) (LS) (OS) (OM) 
6 7 . WYP ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 9 0. PYG ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 
68. BYN ( ( ( ( 91. KYT ( 
69. OYP ( ) ( ( ( 92. TOX ( 
70. TYC ( ) ( ( ) ( 93. VOG ( 
71. ZAC ( ( ) 94. WIO ( 
72. FAV ( ( ( 95. WOK ( 
73. MOH ( 
( 
( ( ) 96. LEP ( 
74. NAL ( ( ( ( 97. LOO ( 
75. PIF ( ( ) ( ) ( 98. LOM ( 
76. PIM ( ( ) ( ) ( 99. KEM ( 
77. BEP ( 100. KIR ( 
78. BYT ( 101. KOC ( 
79. JEP ( 102. KYO ( 
80. RIS ( 103. SYP ( 
81. RIX ( 104. KEL ( 
82. TOX ( 105. SYP ( 
83. VIL ( 106. VIR ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ( 
( ) ( 
( ( 
( ) ( ) ( ) 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( ) 
( 
( 
( ) ( ( 
( ) ( ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( ) ( 
( ) ( 
( ( 
( ( 
( ( ) 
84. WAH ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
107. GES ( ) ( ( ) ( 
85. WAQ ( 108. PIZ ( 
86. WOF 109. QIT 
87. GOF ( ( 110. RYO ( 
88. NYC ( ( 111. NUG ( 
89. PAB ( ( ) 112. TOB ( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( ) ( ( 
( ) ( ) ( 
( ( ) ( ) 
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Syllable (LM) (LS) (DS) (OM} Syllable (LM) (LS} (DS} (DM) 
113. KAS ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 127. BIF ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
114. DUR ( ( ) ( 128. JUS ( ( ( 
115. OAF ( ( ) ( 129. KER ( ( ( ( 
116. DUP ( ( ( ) ( 130. RES ( ( ( 
117. HEK ( ( ) ( ) ( 131. VAS ( ) ( ( ) ( 
118. MAJ ( ) ( ( ) ( 132. LAR ( ( ( ( 
119. NAK ( ( ) ( 133. MAH ( ( ( ) 
120. PAG ( ( ( 134. YAW ( ( ( ) ( ) 
121. SIB ( ( ( ) ( 135. CAV ( ( ( ( 
122. CAY ( ( ( ) ( 136. FAC ( ) ( ( ( 
123. coz ( ( ) ( 137. GAV ( ( ) ( ( 
124. VIK ( ( ) ( 138. RYM ( ) ( ( ) ( 
125. FIV ( ( ( ) ( 139. YEH ( ( ( ( 
126. BEY ( ( ( ) ( 140. BIZ ( ( ( ( 
APPENDIX H 
Music Rating Inventory/Auditory stimulus Rating (MRI/ASR) 
1. Did any of this music sound familiar to you? __ yes __ no 
If yes, please list any names of pieces you can recognize. 
2. How loud did this 
very 
soft 
1 2 
3. How much did you 
disliked 
much 
1 2 
music sound to 
3 4 
like this music? 
3 4 
you? 
5 
5 
very 
loud 
6 7 
liked 
much 
6 7 
4. Did this music elicit any emotions for you? Please list 
and rate: 
Emotion: 
Felt Felt 
weakly strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Emotion: 
Felt Felt 
weakly strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Emotion: 
Felt Felt 
weakly strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. How distracting was the music while you were doing the 
other tasks? 
not very 
distracting distracting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX I 
Score Sheet 
~ I I I l . I I l J I f I I I I I i 
~ I I 
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~ I I I I I I I I 
~ I I I I I I I I 
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APPENDIX J 
Directions for Subjects 
(Parenthetical statements for music conditions) [Bracketed 
statements for no music condition] 
Part I 
Hi! My name is MW, and I'd like to thank you for agreeing 
to participate in this experiment. Actually we'll be doing 
several things in this session. (The present experiment 
involves listening to some music which you will evaluate after 
a delay period. During the delay, you will be performing a 
number of filler tasks to ensure that everyone engages in 
similar activities during that delay.) (These) [Today's] 
tasks will be gathering information for (other) [several] 
research projects (unrelated to the present experiment), and 
will involve rating trigrams and recalling memories. (After 
these tasks, you will be rating the auditory stimuli.) Then, 
tomorrow we will be continuing part of what we begin today. 
Before we begin, I want you to understand that all the 
data we collect will be kept anonymous and confidential. You 
will only be identified by a number on the packet you receive, 
so please do not put your name or any other identifying 
information on any of these forms. If for some reason you 
need to discontinue the experiment, you can let me know and do 
so without penalty. To spell all this out for you, here is a 
consent form which I'd like to read carefully and sign. 
{Consent form is distributed, signed, and recollected.} 
To begin, I have a sheet here which I'd like you to fill 
out to let me know how you are feeling right now. (MAl is 
distributed) . 
(As you listen to this music I'll be playing for you, 
please refrain from talking so that each person can listen to 
and experience the music as fully and deeply as possible. Do 
not think about judgments of the music at this time, but just 
sit back and make yourself comfortable, and experience the 
music as it plays. I'll be playing the music for about 8 
minutes, and then we' 11 begin the fill er tasks. {Music is 
played for 8 minutes.}) 
Here is a packet which I would like you to fill out. 
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Please complete each form as it is presented; most of the 
directions are self explanatory, but if you have any 
questions, please let me know. The loose sheet is to be used 
when you come to the section in which it is placed, and it may 
be confusing, so please ask if you have any questions. 
{Packets are distributed}. 
{Upon completion of packet, HSI-G and ASR are distributed 
along with detached HSM form, with the instructions:} Here are 
the last two things for you to do. I'm giving you your memory 
sheet to refer to if you need to. 
{Upon completion of these forms, subject's second day 
appointment is confirmed, and subject is told to expect an 
individualized session} 
Part II 
As I mentioned yesterday, this is an individualized 
session; we'll be doing some things we can only do one person 
at a time. As I also mentioned there are several experiments 
going on in these two sessions. (The first experiment 
involves evaluation of auditory stimuli, and during the delay 
period you are asked to do other tasks to assure that all 
subjects participate in the same activity during the delay. 
Today you will be hearing music again, and the other) 
[Today's] task involves a learning experiment, which I will 
explain to you in just a little bit. First, I would like you 
to fill this out for me to indicate how you feel right now. 
{MA4 is administered.} 
(Next I would like you to listen to the music I'll be 
playing for you on this tape. Pleas do no think about 
evaluation of the music at this time, but allow yourself to 
experience it as fully and deeply as possible. This time I 
will be leaving the room for about 8 minutes, and when I come 
back we'll begin the learning experiment.) 
({Experimenter begins music, leaves room and returns in 
8 minutes. MA5 is administered with the directions:} Could 
you fill this out for me please?) 
For the learning experiment we'll be using this 
instrument here. It's called a memory, and it doesn't shock 
you, so don't worry about that. In these windows you'll be 
seeing trigrams like the ones you rated yesterday. They are 
grouped into eight pairs, and your job is to learn the pairs. 
This is what I want you to do. One trigram will appear at a 
time in the window here when I open it. And I would like you 
to say that trigram out loud, in any pronunciation you like. 
Then say "GOES WITH" and when the second trigram of the pair 
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appears, say that one. A blank space will appear between the 
pairs, and you'll continue this process with the remaining 
pairs as they come up in the window. In this way you will be 
learning which trigrams go with each other. For example it 
might look like this {sample trigrams are shown on a separate 
piece of paper}: You would say {trigram GAV is shown} "GAV 
goes with" {trigram RYM is shown} "RYM." {A space is shown, 
followed by BIF} "BIF goes with" {JUM is shown} "JUM." OK? 
After you have seen all eight pairs here, we will switch 
to this window. The pairs are the same, but they will be in 
a different order in each window. So this pair might come 
later in the list {point at GAV-RYM}, while this one is first 
{point at BIF-JUM}, but the pair will still be exactly the 
same. The goal of the task is to be able to name the second 
trigram of each pair before it appears in the window. This 
will indicate that you have learned that pair. So, in the 
second window and on the trials that come after, say the first 
trigram when it appears, say "GOES WITH" and try to guess the 
second trigram before it pops up in the window. If you don't 
know what it is, you can do the same thing as the first time 
through, just name the first one, say "GOES WITH" and 
pronounce the second one after it does appear. We will 
continue with these trials until you can correctly name all 
the pairs in a row on two consecutive trials. So you need to 
get them all right, twice in a row. Does this make sense? Do 
you have any questions? {Addition questions of subject are 
answered.} Ok, first I need you to line yourself up so that 
you can see one trigram at a time in there ... Now if you'll 
say the first one, I'll turn it on and we'll get started. 
{Subject begins task, experimenter changes windows at end of 
each trial and records hits and misses on all trials.} 
APPENDIX K 
Directions for Judges-Positive/Negative 
Instructions for Coding Memories 
Prof. W.G. Parrott 
Department of Psychology 
Georgetown University 
The purpose of having judges rate the subjects' memories 
is to convert the relevant aspects of these verbal 
descriptions to a numerical form that we can analyze 
statistically. We are interested in two aspects of each 
memory: how positive and how negative it was for the subject. 
For each memory, you are to provide two ratings, each on a 1 
to 7 scale. On this scale, the number 1 indicates the absence 
of positive or negative affect; the number 7 indicates very 
intense positive or negative affect. Positive and negative 
refer to emotions and evaluations. These categories do not 
discriminate between various emotions with the same valence. 
Thus, happiness, pride, affection, and belonging all count as 
positive; anger, sadness, fear, humiliation, and so forth all 
count as negative. 
You might wonder why we need two numbers for each memory 
rather than just one, say, ranging from -6 to +6. The reason 
is that if we are to distinguish mixed emotions from no 
emotions, two scales are necessary. For example, subjects 
occasionally remember their high school graduations, and they 
often report that this occasion included not only happiness 
and pride but also sadness and anxiety (e.g., at leaving old 
friends and moving on to an uncertain future) . Such memories 
seem to strike a balance between strong positive and negative 
feelings. Subjects also occasionally recall fairly 
unemotional events, say, watching TV after scool. If we used 
a single scale, it would be impossible to capture the 
important differences betwen these memories, since both would 
have to be rated near zero on the -6 to +6 scale. Using two 
scales, the graduation memory migh be rated something like 
(6,5) while the TV memory might score a (2,1). (Ratings of 
positive are listed before negative.) 
We will practice on several memories from a pilot 
experiment before we rate the memories from our experiment. 
After making the practice ratings, we will compare our ratings 
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and discuss the issues and differences that arise. After this 
practice and discussion, you will find that you will be able 
to reach a high degree of agreement in your independent 
judgments. The following principles have been found to be 
helpful in the past. Let's discuss them before making our 
practice ratings. 
I. The Objectivity Principle 
Be as objective as you can. We have asked the subjects 
to describe their memories, and have specifically requested 
that they describe their feelings at the time the memory 
occurred. Even so, you will find that a certain amount of 
"reading between the lines" is necessary to reach a decision 
about the intensity of positive and negative affect in the 
memory. There are many reasons for this. The main reason is 
simply that it is the nature of human discourse to assume 
that your audience shares certain knowledge with you and that 
you don't need to spell everything out. Some subjects do this 
more than others, but it's nearly impossible to spell 
everything out, so all memories will require you to make 
certain inferences. Some memories will require more than this 
minimum, however. Some will be sketchy and vague, and you may 
have to use some intuition to infer the subject's evaluations 
and reactions to the events described. The point of the 
objectivity principle, however, is that such inferences would 
be strictly based on the information provided by the subject. 
As much as you can, believe what the subject says and resist 
engaging in armchair psychoanalysis. If the subject merely 
says that he or she felt "happy", then you may use contextual 
information that clearly indicates how intense this happiness 
was, but you should resist delving much more deeply that. For 
example, the subject's statements about the significance of 
the event are clearly relevant in determining how happy 
"happy" is, but your own notions about how significant such 
events ought to be are not. This principle leads to two 
corollaries. 
Corollary 1. The Subject is the Authority. Believe what 
the subject says. If the subject recalls learning that 
she made the junior varsity cheerleading squad, and she 
says that this was the greatest moment of her life and 
that she was on Cloud 9 for three weeks afterward, 
believe her. You are rating what the subjects say, not 
what you think they ought to say or what they relay 
probably meant to say despite their claiming the reverse. 
Corollarv 2. Emotional Intensity is Related to the 
Perspective of the Moment. The intensity of positive and 
negative affect is related to people's assessment. Rate 
the intensity of the event as it was experienced at the 
time, not as an objective assessment would dictate. 
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II. The Synchronic Principle 
Your task as judge, to rate the affective tone of the 
event the subject recalled, presupposes that there is in fact 
a single overall level of affect present. But what if the 
memory involves a series of events that differ in their 
emotional content? The instructions to the subject were 
designed to minimize this possibility -- they were asked to 
recall single events. But "events" can sometimes have a 
narrative structure that involves a number of emotional 
episodes. A subject may recall being alone at a party 
{lonely), then meeting some new friends {happy) with whom he 
got drunk {fun) and then went driving around town {seemed 
great at the time) until they got into an accident and were 
arrested by police and taken to the station until they were 
picked up by their parents at 4:00 a.m. {fear and guilt), all 
of which made a great story the next day at school {humor). 
How do you assign a single rating to a memory like this? If 
possible, pick the time that seemed most salient to the 
subject, the time that seemed the focus of the story, the 
point that appears to have popped to mind first for the 
subject. This is sometimes difficult to do; fortunately, this 
problem is fairly rare. The point of the synchronic Principle 
is that a string of emotional moments is not the same as a 
single moment of mixed emotions; therefore we should try to 
rate the one emotional moment that seems to be the focus of 
the story and ignore the other moments that are being 
described mainly to supply context. If you cannot determine 
what part of the story is the focus and what is the context, 
then you have no choice but to treat the memory as a 
diachronic unit, as a sort of "mixed emotion" spread out over 
time. 
By the way, some subjects will nevertheless recall things 
that happened repeatedly, e.g. "going to soccer practice after 
school. " The problem with this, of course, is that some 
soccer practices were fun, others were awful, and most were 
something in between. In these cases you will have to use 
your judgment and try to determine what general evaluation the 
subject has of this activity. 
III. The Scale Calibration Principle 
You want to try to use all 7 points of the scale. If you 
decide that a 6 or a 7 can be used only for the most powerful 
of human experiences, you may well only use the first five 
points on the scale for actual memories, and thus will in 
effect be using only a 5 point scale. Likewise, try to make 
7 levels of discrimination; if you only use 1, 4, and 7, 
you're in effect using only a 3 point scale. 11 1 11 means none, 
11 7" means extremely intense, "4" means indicates a moderate 
level. 2, 3, 5, and 6 allow you to make some intermediate 
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judgments. One of the purposes of letting you practice on 
pilot memories is so you can get a feel for the range of 
things that college students typically recall. This will help 
you develop standards you can apply in judging the memories. 
It will also give you the confidence to go a long time without 
using one end of the scale should you encounter a string of 
mild or intense memories. Your criteria should not get moved 
around as you judge the memories from the experiment. 
Another purpose of the practice session is to allow all 
the judges to converge on a common calibration. My main 
concern is that you use the full range of the scale and that 
you be sensitive to differences between memories. If there 
are some differences between judges' criteria for the 
extremes, I will not be too worried. Some judges may tend to 
be a bit stingier or more generous than others. This is why 
I evaluate the reliability of the judges with the correlation 
coefficient rather than with some other measure. I am less 
concerned that judges agree on what is a 11 5 11 and what is a 11 6 11 
than I am that judges be sensitive to differences between 
memories and agree that one memory is more or less positive or 
negative than another. 
v. The Common Sense Principle 
Repeated throughout the above discussion is the phrase 
"use your own judgment. 11 The point of this final principle is 
that you should ignore any rule you might be following rather 
than allow it to cause you to give a rating that is blatantly 
stupid. As Dr. Spock says to parents, "You know more than you 
think you do." 
APPENDIX L 
Directions for Judges-Overall 
Instructions for Coding Memories 
Adapted in part from Prof. W.G. Parrott 
Department of Psychology 
Georgetown University 
The purpose of having judges rate the subjects' memories 
is to convert the relevant aspects of these verbal 
descriptions to a numerical form that we can analyze 
statistically. We are interested in one particular aspect of 
each memory: its affective tone, or how positive or negative 
it was for the subject. For each memory, you are to provide 
a rating on a 1 to 7 scale. On this scale, the number 1 
indicates very intense negative affect, while the number 7 
indicates very intense positive affect. Positive and negative 
refer to emotions and evaluations. These categories do not 
discriminate between various emotions with the same valence. 
Thus, happiness, pride, affection, and belonging all count as 
positive; anger, sadness, fear, humiliation, and so forth all 
count as negative. 
The scale we use to rate each memory reflects the idea 
that "positive" and "negative" are dialectical terms, 
representing diametrically opposite ends of a single concept 
which might be called "affective valence." Each term 
effectively defines the other, so that more of one implies 
less of the other, much the way "more tall" means "less 
short." Thus, a more positive emotional tone of an experience 
implies an intrinsic lessening of negative tone. For example, 
a experience of satisfaction with a job well done by 
definition implies that one is not dissatisfied with one's 
performance. 
The use of a single bipolar scale for judging affect does 
not assume that every memory will be either completely 
positive or completely negative; mixed emotions are quite 
possible and even likely. However, our purpose is to rate the 
overall affective tone of the experience recalled. Strong 
negative emotions may counter strong positive emotions, or 
vice versa, so that the overall tone of this person's 
experience would be "balanced," scored as 11 4 11 on our scale. 
on the other hand, many memories will seem to lean in one 
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direction or the other, either slightly or dramatically. A 
preponderance of either positive or negative affective tone is 
indicated by an more extreme score either toward the low or 
high end of the scale. The question to keep in mind is: When 
all factors reported by the subject are weighed in, how 
positive or negative was this event as a whole? 
We will practice on several memories from a pilot 
experiment before we rate the memories from our experiment. 
After making the practice ratings, we will compare our ratings 
and discuss the issues and differences that arise. After this 
practice and discussion, you will find that you will be able 
to reach a high degree of agreement in your independent 
judgments. The following principles have been found to be 
helpful in the past. Let's discuss them before making our 
practice ratings. 
I. The Objectivity Principle 
Be as objective as you can. We have asked the subjects 
to describe their memories, and have specifically requested 
that they describe their feelings at the time the memory 
occurred. Even so, you will find that a certain amount of 
"reading between the lines" is necessary to reach a decision 
about the intensity of positive and negative affect in the 
memory. There are many reasons for this. The main reason is 
simply that it is the nature of human discourse to assume 
that your audience shares certain knowledge with you and that 
you don't need to spell everything out. Some subjects do this 
more than others, but it's nearly impossible to spell 
everything out, so all memories will require you to make 
certain inferences. Some memories will require more than this 
minimum, however. Some will be sketchy and vague, and you may 
have to use some intuition to infer the subject's evaluations 
and reactions to the events described. The point of the 
objectivity principle, however, is that such inferences would 
be strictly based on the information provided by the subject. 
As much as you can, believe what the subject says and resist 
engaging in armchair psychoanalysis. If the subject merely 
says that he or she felt "happy", then you may use contextual 
information that clearly indicates how intense this happiness 
was, but you should resist delving much more deeply that. For 
example, the subject's statements about the significance of 
the event are clearly relevant in determining how happy 
"happy" is, but your own notions about how significant such 
events ought to be are not. This principle leads to two 
corollaries. 
Corollarv 1. The Subject is the Authority. Believe what 
the subject says. If the subject recalls learning that 
she made the junior varsity cheerleading squad, and she 
says that this was the greatest moment of her life and 
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that she was on Cloud 9 for three weeks afterward, 
believe her. You are rating what the subjects say, not 
what you think they ought to say or what they relay 
probably meant to say despite their claiming the reverse. 
Corollarv 2. Emotional Intensity is Related to the 
Perspective of the Moment. The intensity of positive and 
negative affect is related to people's assessment. Rate 
the intensity of the event as it was experienced at the 
time, not as an objective assessment would dictate. 
II. The Synchronic Principle 
Your task as judge, to rate the affective tone of the 
event the subject recalled, presupposes that there is in fact 
a single overall level of affect present. But what if the 
memory involves a series of events that differ in their 
emotional content? The instructions to the subject were 
designed to minimize this possibility -- they were asked to 
recall single events. But "events" can sometimes have a 
narrative structure that involves a number of emotional 
episodes. A subject may recall being alone at a party 
(lonely), then meeting some new friends (happy) with whom he 
got drunk (fun) and then went driving around town (seemed 
great at the time) until they got into an accident and were 
arrested by police and taken to the station until they were 
picked up by their parents at 4:00 a.m. (fear and guilt), all 
of which made a great story the next day at school (humor). 
How do you assign a single rating to a memory like this? If 
possible, pick the time that seemed most salient to the 
subject, the time that seemed the focus of the story, the 
point that appears to have popped to mind first for the 
subject. This is sometimes difficult to do; fortunately, this 
problem is fairly rare. The point of the synchronic Principle 
is that a string of emotional moments is not the same as a 
single moment of mixed emotions; therefore we should try to 
rate the one emotional moment that seems to be the focus of 
the story and ignore the other moments that are being 
described mainly to supply context. If you cannot determine 
what part of the story is the focus and what is the context, 
then you have no choice but to treat the memory as a 
diachronic unit, as a sort of "mixed emotion" spread out over 
time. 
By the way, some subjects will nevertheless recall things 
that happened repeatedly, e.g. "going to soccer practice after 
school. " The problem with this, of course, is that some 
soccer practices were fun, others were awful, and most were 
something in between. In these cases you will have to use 
your judgment and try to determine what general evaluation the 
subject has of this activity. 
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III. The Scale Calibration Principle 
You want to try to use all 7 points of the scale. If you 
decide that a 1 or a 7 can be used only for the most powerful 
of human experiences, you may well only use the middle five 
points on the scale for actual memories, and thus will in 
effect be using only a 5 point scale. Likewise, try to make 
7 levels of discrimination; if you only use 1, 4, and 7, 
you' re in effect using only a 3 point scale. "1 11 means 
extremely negative, 11 7 11 means extremely positive, 11 4 11 means 
balanced. 2, 3, 5, and 6 allow you to make some intermediate 
judgments. One of the purposes of letting you practice on 
pilot memories is so you can get a feel for the range of 
things that college students typically recall. This will help 
you develop standards you can apply in judging the memories. 
It will also give you the confidence to go a long time without 
using one end of the scale should you encounter a string of 
mild or intense memories. Your criteria should not get moved 
around as you judge the memories from the experiment. 
Another purpose of the practice session is to allow all 
the judges to converge on a common calibration. My main 
concern is that you use the full range of the scale and that 
you be sensitive to differences between memories. If there 
are some differences between judges' criteria for the 
extremes, I will not be too worried. Some judges may tend to 
be a bit stingier or more generous than others. This is why 
I evaluate the reliability of the judges with the correlation 
coefficient rather than with some other measure. I am less 
concerned that judges agree on what is a 11 5 11 and what is a 11 6 11 
than I am that judges be sensitive to differences between 
memories and agree that one memory is more or less positive or 
negative than another. 
V. The Common Sense Principle 
Repeated throughout the above discussion is the phrase 
"use your own judgment." The point of this final principle is 
that you should ignore any rule you might be following rather 
than allow it to cause you to give a rating that is blatantly 
stupid. As Dr. Spock says to parents, "You know more than you 
think you do." 
VI. Examples 
To illustrate these principles, here are three example 
memories and possible scores for each. These are not meant to 
be criteria to which you must compare the actual memories you 
judge. They should serve to show how some common elements of 
memories may be reflected in a score. 
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1. Event: My sister"s dog getting killed by a car. 
How did you feel about this event? crushed. I felt so bad 
for her, because she doted on that dog. But I was really 
relieved it wasn't my cat. 
Rating and explanation: 11 2 11 The clearly negative affect 
could be scored as a "1" if it stood alone. However, the 
positive aspect is present as a counterbalance, so a slightly 
less extreme score is given. Some judges might think it is 
unusual to feel "relieved" at an otherwise tragic event, but 
it is important to believe the subject"s report of his/her 
experience. 
2. Event: Visiting the state capitol. 
How did you feel about this event? Just being there 
supported my dream of being a representative and lawmaker. 
But the tour guide made it sound so dull that I was pissed off 
the whole time. 
Rating and explanation: "4" The occurrence of fairly 
strong positive feelings can be inferred from the first 
sentence. Yet the fairly strong negative feelings stated in 
the next sentence approximately balance the positive affect. 
3. Event: Graduation. 
How did you feel about this event? I thought I would be 
sad, but when the time came, I was ecstatic. 
Rating and explanation: "7" Previous expectations 
occurring before the recalled event seem to be context. 
Emotions of the actual event are clearly and strongly 
positive. 
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